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Introduction

Russia’s Energy Policy: Should Europe Worry?*
By Jeronim Perovic, Zurich, and Robert Orttung, Washington
Abstract
East-West relations are deteriorating to a level not seen since the Soviet period. Recent cover stories 
on Russia from Th e Economist (December 16, 2006) and Der Spiegel (March 5, 2007) present Presi-
dent Vladimir Putin as a gangster with a gasoline pump and a Soviet Commissar wielding Gazprom’s 
massive pipeline network. Th ese images illustrate a growing fear in the West that Russia is a threat. 
Russia, according to this point of view, is using energy as a weapon to rebuild its empire. Th is arti-
cle examines to what extent Europe, which is heavily dependent on Russian oil and natural gas sup-
plies, should worry.
Real and Perceived Th reats
What the European consumer of Russian gas and oil worries about is mainly what he or she decides to worry 
about. A major turning point in Europe’s perception followed the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute in January 2006: 
Many European governments and large parts of the media decided that the short-lived shutdown of Russian 
gas deliveries to Ukraine were something to worry about. Moscow had a diﬀ erent perception at the time: it 
simply could not understand why Europe sided with Ukraine in a conﬂ ict where, in Moscow’s view, the issue 
was Ukrainian theft of Russian gas and living on Russian subsidies. 
First, what Moscow failed to grasp was how the Europeans would interpret the way Russia treated its neigh-
bor. From the European perspective, abruptly closing the pipe was not an appropriate means of resolving price 
disputes. Th e Europeans complained that they always paid their bills on time, so they could not fathom why 
the Russians would resort to such an extreme measure without prior consultation of its European costumers. 
Second, and more importantly, Russia’s assertive move against Ukraine came at a bad time. Th e overall 
political context at the beginning of 2006 was charged negatively against Russia. Th ese general atmospherics 
had less to do with Russia’s energy behavior than with the West’s image of Russia as an increasingly author-
itarian and anti-democratic power. Only against this larger background is it possible to understand why the 
shutdown of gas deliveries, which, after all, lasted only 24 hours, had such a tremendous psychological impact. 
Never mind that the Soviet Union/Russia had been a reliable supplier for the past 30 years, the question for 
Europe ultimately is whether it wants to partner with this kind of Russia moving forward. 
Russia’s problems with its transit country neighbors are a cause of concern for the near-term – a recent case 
in point is the dispute over oil and gas prices between Russia and Belarus, which led to a three-day stoppage 
in Russian oil deliveries in January 2007. Th is issue will be much less important in the middle to long term. 
Russia’s dependency on transit countries will decrease with the construction of new pipeline routes. Recent 
examples are the North European Gas Pipeline linking Russia directly to Germany through the Baltic Sea, the 
planned expansion of the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) with the construction of a new oil pipeline to Primorsk 
circumventing Belarus, and the recently announced construction of an oil pipeline from Bulgaria’s Black Sea 
port of Burgas to Alexandroupolis, in northern Greece. In mid-March 2007, Hungary decided to go ahead 
with the project to extend the Blue Stream gas pipeline from Turkey to Hungary. Th is project will lessen Rus-
sia’s dependency on Ukraine and also undermine the EU favored Nabucco pipeline project, which is planned 
to carry Iranian and Caspian natural gas to Europe and runs along the same route as the Blue Stream extended 
pipeline. (See the corresponding oil and gas maps on p. 18 and 19.) 
Also, even if Russia’s price hikes will cause more friction in the years to come, bringing the CIS prices up 
to world levels are a healthy development. Although moving at diﬀ erent speeds, Russia has been raising prices 
for its adversaries (i.e. Georgia) and allies (i.e. Belarus) alike. In this context, what are the issues that Europe 
should be concerned about when it comes to Russia’s energy policy?
*  Th is a slightly updated version of the text published originally in Russian Analytical Digest, no. 18, 3 April 2007, pp. 2–7.
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Developments in Russia’s Oil Sector
According to the most recent EU Commission ﬁ gures, 27 percent of EU oil consumption is of Russian origin 
and 30 percent of EU oil imports are from Russia. About a quarter of this oil is transported directly to Europe 
via the “Druzhba”-pipeline through Belarus; the bulk of the oil is transported to various maritime ports and 
shipped further with tankers (see the corresponding map on p. 18). Given that Europe’s own oil production 
is declining, Russian oil is and will remain critical for Europe. Recent developments in Russia’s oil sector are, 
however, potentially bad news for the European costumer. 
Russia’s oil sector is dominated by a handful of private oil companies. It is largely due to these companies 
that Russian petroleum output was able to recover during the 1990s and is doing reasonably well today. How-
ever, there has been a trend towards re-nationalization starting with the destruction of Yukos in 2003. As Fig-
ure 1 on p. 13 illustrates, state ownership has increased since 2003 and is likely to expand further. 
It is still too early to understand what eﬀ ect increasing state power will have on the Russian oil sector; how-
ever, the expansion of state ownership is unlikely to have a positive impact on production and growth. More-
over, the atmosphere created by this trend is certainly not attractive to foreign investors. To be sure, Russia gets 
more direct foreign investment than ever before, but not in new long-term energy projects where very large 
sums are required, and where investors need to have the security that they will not be pushed out of the proj-
ects once they become operational.
But since the oil market is a global market with a relatively small share of oil transported through pipelines, 
Europe has some room for maneuver. Should Russian production stagnate or decline or should Russia divert 
considerably more of its oil to the Asian market, Europe could theoretically turn to other suppliers. According 
to Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2020, approved by President Putin in May 2003, Russia plans to export about 
a third its oil to Asia by the year 2020. Whether Russia will indeed manage to export substantially more of 
its oil (and gas) to Asia without diverting current supplies away from Europe depends largely on the develop-
ment of new ﬁ elds in East Siberia and the Far East – in addition to the production of the Sakhalin ﬁ elds. As of 
today, however, Russia has invested very little in a region which is believed to contain some 13 percent of Rus-
sia’s total oil reserves and 19 percent of its gas, but located in extremely harsh climate making production dif-
ﬁ cult and costly. Also, Russia still lacks major trunk oil (and gas) pipelines which would be capable of trans-
porting large volumes of energy to the Asia-Paciﬁ c market. 
Developments in Russia’s Gas Sector
Gas is a diﬀ erent story for three reasons: First, natural gas is and will remain largely a pipeline market, despite 
the growing importance of liqueﬁ ed natural gas (LNG), which can be transported by tanker ship. Second, the 
dependency of Europe on Russia is signiﬁ cant. Th ird, Europe’s gas demand is expected to increase much more 
than its oil demand. 
Th e share of Russian gas in the gas consumption of individual European countries is high (see the diagram 
of European countries’ share of Russian gas consumption on p. 20). Overall, according to EU Commission 
ﬁ gures, the Russian share in EU gas consumption is 24 percent, the share of gas imported from Russia is 44 
percent. Most of the rest currently comes from Algeria. 
If Europe’s gas imports indeed increase by over a 100 percent by 2030, as International Energy Agency (IEA) 
projections suggest, then one thing is certain: Russia alone will not be able to meet this increasing demand 
even if the most optimistic scenarios about Russian gas production and export capabilities hold true. Russia 
will remain the single biggest supplier, but in relative terms, its importance will decline and Europe will have 
to look for alternative suppliers, including North African countries (notably Algeria), Iran and Qatar. Accord-
ing to the IEA and other estimates, Russia’s share of European supply will drop from the current 70 percent to 
35–40 percent of EU-30 imports by 2030.
Adding fuel to growing concerns about Europe’s increasing dependency on gas imports were Putin’s repeated 
statements in favor of the creation of a cartel of the world’s leading gas exporting countries, including Russia, 
Qatar and Iran. Putin announced he would dispatch a team of experts to the Qatari capital, Doha, in April 
2007 to further explore a possible gas alliance. Although most energy experts – including a number of senior 
Russian oﬃ  cials – consider the formation of a gas alliance a highly unrealistic idea, which in any case would 
not serve Russian economic interests, Putin’s public announcements have stirred up even more uneasiness about 
Russia. (See analysis “Will Russia Create a Gas Cartel?” on p. 75.) 
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Russia’s major gas ﬁ elds are declining fast. Whether Russia manages to produce more gas and export more to 
Europe depends on four factors: the development of new ﬁ elds, Russia’s domestic energy market, Russia’s inde-
pendent gas producers, and the amount of gas from Central Asia. 
Development of New Fields
Th e development of new gas ﬁ elds is of paramount importance for Russia to achieve its target output lev-
els (see Figure 2 on p. 14). Two issues are potentially worrisome, however: 
A ﬁ rst concern is Gazprom’s announcement that it intends to develop the new oﬀ shore ﬁ elds, such as Shtok-
man or the Yamal ﬁ elds, without foreign partners. Experts question whether Gazprom on its own is capable 
of developing these ﬁ elds, which would be so important for Europe, but which are located in extremely diﬃ  -
cult terrain and require up-to-date technology. Gazprom’s desire to go it alone indicates a trend towards energy 
nationalism, which is deﬁ ning the new reality. Russian law makes it impossible for foreigners to control large 
oﬀ shore ﬁ elds. Th ey can take part in the development projects, but they are not allowed a controlling share.
A second worry is that it is unclear when the new ﬁ elds will start producing. Without massive foreign invest-
ment, Gazprom will simply not have the money to develop new ﬁ elds and simultaneously take care of other 
urgent matters, in particular the modernization of its infrastructure. Th e investments in the Shtokman ﬁ eld 
alone are expected to amount to $12–14 billion in the ﬁ rst stage of the project.
Th e production-oriented upstream sector makes up only a modest share of Gazprom’s investments, accord-
ing to the company’s own ﬁ gures (see Figure 3 on p. 14). At the same time, Gazprom has spent lots of money 
building additional export pipelines and buying up foreign assets in the downstream sector, especially distribu-
tion networks in European countries. What Gazprom obviously wants is to control the whole chain of supply: 
from production to transportation and distribution. Gazprom seeks to establish dependencies via the building 
of export pipelines and long-term contracts, and only later worries about actually ﬁ lling the pipelines. Gaz-
prom CEO Alexei Miller’s motto is simple: gas will not be produced until it is sold. 
Th e Domestic Energy Market
Th e single biggest challenge for Russia in the energy sphere will be the reform of the domestic energy sector. 
Russia’s Energy Strategy estimates that as much as $200 billion must be spent in the gas sector alone by 2020. 
Th e numbers for the other sectors are no less impressive, as Figure 4 on p. 15 demonstrates. 
However, reform has not yet seriously started. In the gas sector, the trend is even going backwards: If dur-
ing the 1990s, there was discussion of liberalizing the gas market and breaking up Gazprom, today Putin and 
his entourage are in favor of enlarging and empowering this company. 
Th e philosophy behind this strategy can be illustrated with a quotation from President Putin’s speech at 
a reception commemorating the 10th anniversary of the founding of Gazprom: “Gazprom, as a strategically 
important company, should be kept, and has been kept, as a single organism. (…) Gazprom is a powerful polit-
ical and economic lever of inﬂ uence over the rest of the world.”
More likely at this point is a rise in domestic gas prices. Gas costs about $52 per 1,000 cubic meters for 
Russia’s domestic customers. Russian Economic Development and Trade Minister German Gref announced 
on March 2, 2007, that the price will increase to around $100 by 2010. Whether this price increase will actu-
ally take place depends on the next Russian president. As long as gas is subsidized, it is simply not proﬁ table to 
invest in the development of other energy sources. 
Gas makes up the bulk of Russia’s primary energy consumption (see Figure 5 on p. 15); in fact, in absolute 
volume, Russia uses more gas than any other country in the world. However, even if Russia replaces some gas 
consumption with nuclear or coal – a key ambition of Russia’s current energy policy – domestic demand for 
gas is still expected to increase. Th is rising demand, of course, would leave less gas for export.
On top of all this, Russia intends to export more gas to Asia (see Figure 6 on p. 16). Th is shift in exports 
should not concern Europe as long as Russian gas is exported from new ﬁ elds in East Siberia or the Far East, 
for example from the still to be developed Kovytka gas ﬁ eld, which is one of the largest in Russia. Th e one proj-
ect that Europe should worry about at the moment is the proposed Altai pipeline from West Siberia to China, 
which would eventually redirect gas ﬂ ows from west to east. Although many analysts believe that this proj-
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ect is too expensive to be realized, plans to build it clearly show that Russia is eager to diversify its oil and gas 
exports. Th e same way that Europe does not want to be too dependent on Russia, Russia does not want to be 
too dependent on Europe. 
Th e Role of Independent Gas Producers
A key assumption in determining Russian production ﬁ gures is that the share of gas produced by independent 
producers will increase. According to Russia’s Energy Strategy, independent producers could produce up to 
25 percent of Russia’s total output by 2020 (with roughly half of the gas coming from non-Gazprom gas pro-
ducers and half from oil companies). As Figure 7 on p. 16 shows, independent producers accounted for basi-
cally all the growth in the gas sector in recent years; Gazprom accounted for negative or zero growth. Allow-
ing the independent producers to ﬂ ourish would be good news. However, the question remains whether Gaz-
prom and the Russian government will allow the independents such liberty. Th ere are indications that Gaz-
prom seeks to strengthen control over them. 
A case in point is the situation surrounding the Kovytka project, which TNK-BP hopes to develop. TNK-
BP is a 50-50 joint venture between BP and Renova Group, in which Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselberg is 
the dominant shareholder. TNK-BP owns a 62.4 percent stake in Rusia Petroleum, the operating company at 
Kovytka. Kovytka is currently the richest gas project in East Siberia, with the potential to develop into a spring-
board for the establishment of a uniﬁ ed gas supply system in the east of Russia. With annual production esti-
mated at 40–45 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, Kovytka could produce enough gas to satisfy 15–20 per-
cent of the non-contracted gas demand of China and South Korea by 2020. 
It is highly unlikely that Gazprom will allow Kovytka’s gas to be exported unless it can gain a controlling 
share in this project. While the regional implementation of the project is underway, Gazprom has so far eﬀ ec-
tively stalled the international sales, which would include the construction of an export pipeline to China. Since 
the Russian government has assigned Gazprom as the oﬃ  cial coordinator for the development of gas produc-
tion in the Russian east, and given that only Gazprom has the right to own and operate gas export pipelines in 
Russia, the Kovytka project is entirely at the mercy of Gazprom. According to Vekselberg, “Gazprom’s entry 
into the project is inevitable.” 
Th e situation around the Kovytka project resembles recent trends in the gas sector, particularly the case of 
the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project, in which the Russian state forced foreign companies to hand over part of their 
stakes to Gazprom for $7.45 billion on December 21, 2006. Sakhalin-2 was established in 1994 and was the 
only project in Russia that lacked Russian participation. In order to get the foreign partners to hand over their 
stakes, Moscow threatened them with the enforcement of the country’s environmental legislation, alleging that 
project activities had violated it. Once the deal was complete, these environmental concerns disappeared.
Gas from Central Asia
Another key assumption is that Central Asian gas continues to ﬂ ow north. It is much cheaper for Russia to buy 
up Central Asia’s gas than invest in expensive ﬁ elds in its north. Since all the major Central Asian gas pipelines 
go through Russia, it has so far been easy for Russia to “convince” the Central Asians to keep selling their gas 
to Russia. Gazprom currently purchases about 60 bcm a year from Central Asia, an amount which is signiﬁ -
cant but unlikely to increase any time soon, especially if Turkmenistan, which provides the bulk of these sup-
plies, is not able to increase its production substantially. At the same time, it can be expected that Russia will 
be able to at least hold this level and not lose out to Western competitors. 
Th e scale of Russian direct investment in the region is modest, particularly in comparison to the invest-
ment of other countries. Russian foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan, for example, amounted to only 
$930.5 million (or 3.1 percent of total foreign direct investment) for the period between 1993 and September 
2004. Th e three largest foreign investors, the US, Great Britain, and Italy, accounted for almost $15 billion 
(50.73 percent). However, Russia has so far been very good at securing long term contracts on gas deliveries, 
and Russian companies have bought key pieces of energy infrastructure. 
Turkmenistan’s new president, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, has conﬁ rmed the previous gas deal 
signed in 2003, which gives Russia an almost exclusive right to import gas from Turkmenistan at least until 
2028. Under the deal, Turkmenistan sells Gazprom up to 60 bcm of gas in 2007, 60–70 bcm in 2008 and up 
to 80 bcm in each of the following years (in 2006, Gazprom imported 42 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan). 
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Since Turkmenistan’s current output stands at about 60 bcm, it will have to increase production substantially 
to meet its contractual obligations. More importantly, should Turkmenistan indeed decide to stick to the part-
nership with Russia, none of the other interested parties (mainly China, the US and Europe) can hope for direct 
Turkmen gas deliveries in the foreseeable future. 
Gazprom’s relation with Turkmenistan is not, however, a one-way street. Gone are the times when Russia 
virtually blackmailed Turkmenistan to sell its gas for $44 per thousand cubic meters, with only half in cash. 
In 2007, the price stood at $100 and is expected to increase further. Th is jump clearly indicates the importance 
Gazprom attaches to Central Asian gas and also shows that Russia is ready to oﬀ er a (relatively) good price in 
order to outbid international competitors. 
In the foreseeable future, the EU and the US cannot count on substantial amounts of other Caspian gas 
ﬂ owing directly westward. Only Azerbaijan will transport gas in this direction through the newly opened 
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline (also known as the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline). Th ere is little hope that 
large amounts of Kazakh gas will ﬁ ll the pipeline in the near future because a substantial part of Kazakhstan’s 
additional gas production will be absorbed by its expanding petrochemical industry and Kazakhstan’s larg-
est gas ﬁ elds are located in the north of the country near Russian borders and it is more convenient to trans-
port gas via the existing transportation networks. Moreover, China is a serious competitor and might be able 
to draw some of Kazakhstan’s gas export east through a projected pipeline that would follow the already exist-
ing oil pipeline. 
Gazprom is trying to sign contracts for as much of Kazakhstan’s gas as possible. For 2007, Gazprom man-
aged to secure some 8 bcm of gas, which roughly equals Kazakhstan’s total planned gas exports. Gazprom also 
bought 13 bcm of gas from Uzbekistan, which produces almost as much as Turkmenistan, but currently uses 
80 percent for domestic consumption. 
Dealing With a More Assertive Russia
Many of Europe’s worries are the same worries that Russia has, if one reads Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2020 
closely. A major concern of the Energy Strategy is the lack of investment and the negative consequences for 
future production. However, one key diﬀ erence is that Russia is not in the same hurry as Europe is. It is Russia, 
not Europe, which is currently sitting on the oil and gas reserves. For Russia, it is not vitally important if Shtok-
man starts producing in 10, 15 or 20 years. It can be almost certain that Shtokman gas will ﬁ nd a buyer. 
Th e Russia that the West is dealing with today is a diﬀ erent Russia from two–three years ago, and deﬁ -
nitely a more assertive Russia. Earnings from energy exports have played no small role: Income to Russia from 
oil exports grew dramatically from the transition from Yeltsin to Putin, from $14 billion in 1999 to $140 bil-
lion in July 2005–June 2006. As Figure 8 on p. 17 shows, not only has Russia over the past three years almost 
repaid its foreign debts to the Paris Club, it had also accumulated some $89 billion in the stabilization fund 
by the end of 2006. 
Th is new wealth marks a very signiﬁ cant development since it means that Russia feels it is no longer beholden 
to the West, and can pursue a more “independent” foreign policy line. Th is attitude is not only reﬂ ected in 
Putin’s rhetoric over energy export diversiﬁ cation from Europe to Asia or the building of a gas cartel, but shows 
at the level of public diplomacy (e.g. Putin’s speech at the Munich conference on February 2, 2007) or in Rus-
sia’s announcement that it plans to increase military spending substantially, including the modernization of 
its nuclear forces.
What does this all mean for the West? For one thing, it should encourage the West to develop alternative sources 
of energy even more aggressively – the EU has already sent a clear signal with its decision on March 9, 2007, to 
commit the 27 member states to slash overall European greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent and increase the 
share of renewable energy sources to 20 percent of energy consumption by 2020. Likewise, US President George 
Bush has announced plans to reduce gasoline usage by 20 percent over the next decade.
At the same time, the EU and the US should make it clear that these steps are not directed against Russia, 
but are for the beneﬁ t of the environment and sustainable economic development. Neither side gains from a 
further worsening of relations, and the West needs to be careful that relations with Russia do not result in an 
“energy security dilemma,” as recently described by Andrew Monaghan. Such a dilemma might occur when 
the two sides continue to feel insecure vis-à-vis each other and begin to make preparations in case the other 
intends to threaten it. Th ese preparations create extra suspicion and provoke additional measures in order to 
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better prepare for an eventual threat. Translated into energy relations, such preparations would result in an 
intense race to diversify purchases and sales away from each other – despite the fact that because of existing 
mutual dependencies, neither Europe nor Russia desires this outcome. 
As a matter of fact, the current negative political atmosphere and the anti-Russian hype in the Western media 
are not reﬂ ected at the level of economic cooperation with Russia. Gazprom negotiated contracts on long-term gas 
deliveries with a number of energy related companies, including most recently with Italy’s Eni S.p.A. and Gaz de 
France (GdF). Negotiations and contractual agreements continue with a number of other European energy compa-
nies. Th ese agreements, at least, do not indicate any major shifts in attitudes on either side.
Europe needs to formulate a common energy policy toward Russia stressing common interests and needs. 
Th is strategy should be based on a better understanding of what the real and perceived threats are. For exam-
ple, Europe does not necessarily lose if Russia begins to export more gas to China even if the result is less than 
the expected increase in gas supplies for Europe. From an ecological point of view, Russian gas supplies to China 
would help the country reduce its dependence on extremely dirty coal. Greater natural gas use in China would 
help it cut its greenhouse gas emissions. 
Likewise, Russian purchases of European energy assets – a development often portrayed negatively in West-
ern media – in fact facilitate mutual interdependencies, rather than further diversiﬁ cation. However, the West 
should insist on reciprocity; that is, if Russian energy companies are allowed into the EU energy market, then 
EU companies should be allowed to enter the Russian market. Currently, Gazprom has sole ownership of Rus-
sian gas pipelines and Russia’s state-owned company Transneft’ holds the monopoly over the oil pipelines. 
East-West Energy Cooperation Beyond High Politics
It is important that, besides intensifying their energy dialogue at the highest political levels, the West and Rus-
sia look for areas of cooperation in the less politicized – but no less important – areas of their larger energy rela-
tionship. Among the many options, the one area of cooperation that has been largely neglected is the promo-
tion of greater energy eﬃ  ciency through the entire chain of production, transportation and end use, as well as 
the development of renewable energy sources. Th ese are largely unexplored areas of cooperation, which have, 
however, huge development potential and are economically attractive for both sides. Moreover, the promotion 
of energy eﬃ  ciency and renewables is in line with global eﬀ orts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
Because gas prices are heavily subsidized and therefore very low for Russian domestic customers, Russia is 
one of the most ineﬃ  cient countries in terms of the amount of energy it uses. In fact, Russia uses more than 
twice as much energy to produce a unit of GNP as the European Union, though it is making slow improve-
ments. According to the Russian Ministry of Industry and Energy, Russia could save half of its current energy 
use. Since, as Western experience shows, enhancing energy eﬃ  ciency requires not only an initial engagement on 
the part of the state both politically and ﬁ nancially, but also the introduction of innovative models and the latest 
technology, Western companies could contribute to the eﬀ ort to reduce Russian energy use. Helping to boost 
Russian energy eﬃ  ciency may be an eﬀ ective way to improve relations, particularly as Russia has announced 
it plans to reduce its energy subsidies for domestic consumers, forcing them to pay something closer to market 
prices. Th e country members of the International Energy Agency have managed to prevent signiﬁ cant demand 
growth by implementing energy saving measures. Helping Russians reduce their energy demand would help 
make higher prices more palatable for the population and politically acceptable for policy makers. 
Massive losses in the gas sector occur not least because a substantial amount of gas is burned during oil 
production. Although Russia claims that it burned oﬀ  15 bcm of gas in 2005, satellite pictures suggest that as 
much as 60 bcm was ﬂ ared. Th e amount of these ﬂ ares is increasing as oil production increases. Additional gas 
supplies are lost in transit because of Russia’s aging pipeline system. According to Gazprom, investments in 
the gas transmission system could lead to annual gas savings of up to 10 bcm. Th e one area with the greatest 
potential for energy savings is the system of district heating for residences. Now much of the energy devoted 
to heating Russian homes is wasted because the heat is centrally produced and then transported, with signiﬁ -
cant losses along the way. Huge losses also occur in the electricity sector. Introducing more eﬃ  cient methods 
will be costly, but it is time to think about how these measures can be adopted, and how the West could assist 
– not least in order to reduce the associated environmental problems and increase Russian gas supplies.
Finally, joint eﬀ orts should include the development of alternative sources of energy. Russia currently gets 
only about 3.5 percent of its energy supply from renewable sources, including its numerous hydro-electric dams. 
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Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2020 suggests that as much as 30 percent of the country’s energy needs could be 
met using alternative sources, if these were developed to their full potential. Joint Russian-Western research on 
such sources of energy could lead to the development of new technologies that would be extremely valuable on 
the global market place as energy prices continue to rise, beneﬁ ting both Russian and Western partners. 
While there has been considerable tension in Russia’s relations with the West, there is also some potential 
for improving these relations. Eﬀ orts in the energy sector may prove helpful in this regard.
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Russian Oil and Gas Production
Figure 1: Oil Production of Russian Companies, 2001–05
Source: oilcapital.ru
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Figure 3: Gazprom’s Investment Program 2007, US$ Billion 
Source: Gazprom
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Figure 2: Russian Gas Supply Outlook
Source: IEA estimates, in: Optimising Russian natural Gas, IEA, Paris, 2006, p. 34
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Figure 4: Investment Required According to the Energy Strategy (Minimal Estimate)
Source: Russian Energy Strategy 2003–2020
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Figure 6: Projected Russian Gas Supply Until 2030
Source: Tatiana Mitrova, ERI RAS
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Figure 7: Annual Gas Production Growth Rates (in %)
Source: Institute of Energy Policy
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Figure 8: External Debt and Stabilization Fund 2004–07, US$ Billion 
Source: Central Bank of Russia, Ministry of Finance, Bank of Finland
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Russia’s Oil and Gas Industry in an International Context
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2007, http://www.bp.com/statisticalreview
Graph 1: Distribution of Worldwide Proven Oil Reserves (End of 2006)
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Graph 2: Distribution of Worldwide Proven Oil Reserves (End of 2006)
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Graph 3: Distribution of Worldwide Proven Gas Reserves (End of 2006)
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Graph 4: Distribution of Worldwide Proven Gas Reserves (End of 2006)
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Graph 5: Russia’s Oil Production in an International Context 1985–2006 
(in thousands of barrels per day)
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Graph 6: Russia’s Gas Production in an International Context 1985–2006 
(in billions of cubic meters)
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Graph 7: Share of Worldwide Consumption of Oil 2006
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Graph 8: Share of Worldwide Consumption of Gas 2006
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Part I: Russia’s Energy Policy: Economic 
Challenges and Political Strategies

Russian Gas: Will Th ere Be Enough Investment?
By Daniel Simmons and Isabel Murray, International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris
Abstract
In the following piece we outline some of the major challenges facing the gas sector in Russia and 
focus on where some of the potential upsides are to be found. While we remain concerned about the 
overall level of investment in Russian upstream and transportation, the potential of the independent 
gas producers to rise to the challenge seems strong given the right supporting policy measures. Th e 
Russian government seems to be moving in the right direction with regard to domestic pricing pol-
icy and third party access to the pipeline system, yet reliance on imported gas from Central Asia is 
likely to increase the risks to security over the medium term. Our concerns on investment need to 
be seen within the context of our overall concern about global levels of investment, in upstream gas, 
pipelines and other infrastructure and even in the burgeoning liqueﬁ ed natural gas (LNG) industry 
(see the IEA’s Natural Gas Market Review 2007).
Importance of Russia for Global Gas
Russia holds the largest share of proven gas reserves worldwide, it produces and exports more gas than any other 
country and is the second largest gas market in the world after North America. Russia also has a very strong 
export market in Europe where it accounts for almost a quarter of OECD Europe gas needs. It is in Western 
Europe that pipeline gas from Russia meets competition from Atlantic LNG. Th rough this interaction, Rus-
sian gas production and demand has the potential to aﬀ ect other markets, such as the US or Japan, indirectly 
through the global LNG market. Th erefore, an appreciation of supply and demand fundamentals in Russia is 
critical to gaining an understanding of the future of gas markets worldwide.
One state-controlled company, OAO Gazprom, dominates the Russian gas and hydrocarbon sector, account-
ing for over 60% of Russian reserves and almost 85% of Russian production. Gazprom owns the Russian gas 
pipeline system, a key part of any country’s gas industry, and also has a legal monopoly on gas exports. Th ere 
are a series of “independent” gas producing companies operating in Russia, which by dint of the above arrange-
ments can only sell in Russian domestic markets where prices are some 15–20% of those in Europe. Th ese com-
panies, along with Russia’s oil companies (which produce gas from their own ﬁ elds as well as associated gas) 
account for another 20% of Russian gas reserves and produce between 15 and 20% of total production.
Demand for Russian Gas
Th e calls on Russian gas are many: Russian domestic gas demand, currently accounting for 65% of Russian pro-
duction (430 bcm in 2005) is growing at an annual rate of 4–6%. Th is growth is driven by demand for electric-
ity generation (gas provides almost half of Russian power) to support the strong economy, as well as a successful 
regional gasiﬁ cation program by Gazprom. Meanwhile, existing export customers in Europe are increasingly 
looking to Russia to replace falling domestic gas supplies while they too see rising gas demand, again from the 
power sector. Russia is also looking to new markets, such as China, India and North America. 
However, before Russian producers can increase supply to customers, be they internal or external, new or 
old, it must oﬀ set declines of between 10 and 20 bcm/yr each year in existing ﬁ elds. In particular, three super-
giant ﬁ elds, responsible for about half of Russian production, are declining fast. So far, Gazprom has man-
aged the situation by a combination of inﬁ ll drilling – bringing on a series of satellite ﬁ elds surrounding exist-
ing sites – and by exploiting new geological structures in existing ﬁ elds. Th e Nadym-Pur-Taz region has been 
the focus of this activity, and it is hoped that production will continue to at least 2011. Beyond this date Gaz-
prom aims to produce ﬁ rst gas from greenﬁ eld regions – the Yamal peninsula, Barents Sea and East Siberia – 
requiring the resolution of a series of complex technical and practical challenges which are likely to translate 
into high capital expenditure and potentially long lead times. Gazprom itself has declared that the era of cheap 
gas is over for the state company.
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Russian Gas Reserves, Investment and Production Plans
Russia clearly has suﬃ  cient reserves to back up ambitious supply plans; some 26% of global gas reserves (48tcm) 
are located in the country, and there are undoubtedly more to be discovered. Gazprom posted an increase in 
reserves from 29.13tcm to 29.85tcm in 2006, a reserves replacement ratio of 1.06. Th e suﬃ  ciency of reserves 
in Russia is therefore not an issue although it must be mentioned that many of these reserves are in challeng-
ing areas, either on or oﬀ shore in the arctic. While the gas is undoubtedly in place, it will be diﬃ  cult, and 
hence expensive, to extract. 
We are generally concerned about the level of upstream gas investment in resource-holding countries around 
the world, and see a tight global market for gas into the medium term. In Russia however, the level of concern 
is ampliﬁ ed because of its crucial importance as the largest player in the world’s gas markets. 
In meeting the demand for Russian gas, approximately USD 18 billion per year of investment will be needed 
to ensure that suﬃ  cient gas is produced between now and 2030, the majority of which is needed in production 
assets. As the owner of the Russian pipeline system and developer of the Yamal region, Gazprom will need to 
spend the vast majority of upstream and almost all pipeline investment. At the most recent board meeting, the 
directors of Gazprom agreed that the investment budget for 2007 would be USD 29.8 billion, broken down 
into capital investments of USD 12.8 billion, down USD 1.2 billion from the budget agreed at the beginning 
of 2007. Meanwhile, the ﬁ nancial part of the 2007 investment budget agreed to in August increased almost 
3-fold in comparison to the budget agreed to in January, to USD 17 billion – in order to cover all of Gazprom’s 
acquisitions over the year. While Gazprom increases the ﬁ nancial part of its investment budget to buy up assets 
of existing production, its capital expenditures fall far short of what seems necessary to ensure suﬃ  cient new 
production. Over the past ﬁ ve years, the growth in Russian gas production has been mostly due to the inde-
pendent gas producers and Russian oil companies, while Gazprom gas production has grown by less than 1% 
per year. Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent this growth is a result of Gazprom’s acquisition of stakes in 
other gas producing companies which are then aggregated into its production numbers.
However, the problem may not be one of adequate investment, but inadequate transparency in communi-
cating Gazprom’s plans to consumers. While communication issues are a less serious problem than are those 
of adequacy, such problems may adversely aﬀ ect the growth of Russian gas export markets as customers start 
to question future plans. We have been urging Gazprom to publish a greater level of detail with regard to its 
investments to increase trust between both importer and producer, leading to greater security for all, both sup-
pliers and consumers. As in the case of investment, we see this against a background of needing improved trans-
parency in many regions of the world.
Import and Export Security
Recent commercial disputes with its neighbors that have cascaded into Western markets have caused many 
observers to question Russia’s ongoing commitment to reliable supply. However, Russia’s long history as a reli-
able supplier of gas to Europe suggests that it is Russia’s intention to honor contractual commitments to trade 
partners in IEA and the EU. Nevertheless, it is clear that more robust commercial terms are needed for many 
of these contracts if indeed third party security is to be ensured.
Th e Russian pipeline system as it now stands was conceived in the Soviet era, built on the basis of two sources 
of natural gas reserves – major ﬁ elds in West Siberia and the Central Asian states (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan), which then made up part of the Soviet Union. While these Central Asian states are now 
politically independent of Moscow, the pipeline system ensures that they are still physically linked with regard 
to gas trade. Annually some 50 bcm of Central Asian gas has been transported through the Gazprom system. 
Traditionally, Ukraine has been supplied by gas from Turkmenistan. Long term contractual agreements for 
Russian imports of Turkmen gas (of up to 80 bcm/year from 2009–2029) aﬀ ect this arrangement – in terms 
of control and ownership of the gas – and increase Russia’s dependence on Central Asian gas to meet its export 
obligations to the near and far abroad. Furthermore, because they travel through a uniﬁ ed system, domestic 
and export demand is exposed to some degree of risk from Central Asian states. If Central Asian gas produc-
tion increases as expected in the Russian energy strategy, then these risks may increase.
Independent Gas Producers
Independent gas producers and major Russian oil companies control about a third of Russian natural gas reserves 
– on the order of 11 tcm. In 2006, non-Gazprom natural gas production reached 106 bcm, accounting for 16% 
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of the total. Th e Russian Energy Strategy assumes that the share of such “independent” production out of the 
total transported by the Gazprom system will increase to 20% (140–150 bcm) by 2020. A review of various 
projections from the key non-Gazprom gas producing company websites reﬂ ects a much more bullish outlook 
with potential production volumes of over 300 bcm per year possible in the period 2015–2020 if the invest-
ment climate is favorable. Key factors which can help to mobilize this high-potential source of gas production 
are focused on providing security of oﬀ -take at reasonable prices. Currently vast quantities of gas (more than 
20 bcm/year) are ﬂ ared in Russia as the only alternative to the poor economics of sale and hence production.
Russia is seeking a solution to ending gas ﬂ aring through ruling it unlawful (i.e., enforcing license terms 
of 95% use of associated gas by 2011) – but this risks resulting in a dramatic decline in accompanying oil pro-
duction as seen in other countries which have enforced an outright ban. On the other hand, policy measures, 
such as improved economic incentives to remunerate gas production, will have the double beneﬁ t of reduced 
ﬂ aring and increasing non-associated gas production. Th ere are two areas which would seem to need attention: 
access to transportation capacity and price.
Transportation conditions which may lead to increased independent production include improving the terms 
of access for independents and speciﬁ cally, continuing to improve pipeline regulation to ensure that it is cost 
reﬂ ective. Progress has been made recently in this eﬀ ort following the formation of a “Gas Market Coordina-
tor” partnership in 2004 between producers and consumers. More work remains to be done, but this seems to 
be a positive development for independent gas production in the Russian upstream.
Regarding pricing, wellhead prices for independent gas production in Russia will depend heavily on domestic 
market prices as the “premium” export market seems likely to be controlled by Gazprom. Reform of domestic 
gas pricing will therefore have a large eﬀ ect on gas production from independents. It is essential that prices rise 
to levels where producers can earn revenues in excess of cost after transportation and essential gas processing.
However, even after issues of access to transportation capacity and price are addressed, there will remain 
myriad challenges facing independent gas producers in Russia. Th e key seems to be in ensuring that the power 
of Gazprom as a monopoly buyer/transportation provider is balanced so that independents have conﬁ dence 
that they can sell gas proﬁ tably over an extended period.
Domestic Price Reform
Gazprom sells gas in the domestic market at wholesale prices regulated by the Federal Tariﬀ  Service. In 2005, 
Gazprom sold 307 bcm on the domestic market for about USD 13 billion, an average price of USD 1.11/MBtu 
– roughly a ﬁ fth of that paid by OECD countries for gas in the same year. Russian per capita consumption of 
gas is similar to that in Canada, but consumption per unit of GDP is roughly ﬁ ve times higher than IEA coun-
tries. Gazprom has argued for years that regulated prices are below replacement cost levels and contract prices 
to Europe. Despite low prices, Gazprom has ongoing problems in collecting payment from Russian customers 
– in 2005 it reported a total of USD 2 billion in total unpaid bills. 
Annual gas price increases on the order of 25% or more are planned – although elections in early 2008 could 
slow the pace of these plans. Th e outlook is for domestic gas prices to about double from current levels to just 
over USD 2.64/MBtu (USD 100/1,000 m3) in 2010, still only 40% of current European export prices (which 
may change in the interim). President Putin has stated that he expects Russian domestic gas prices to level oﬀ  at 
a rate of 60–70% of European prices given the transportation netback. Domestic prices still have a long way to 
go after 2010 to match this intended ratio given the diﬀ erential of nearly USD 5.28/MBtu (USD 200/1,000 m3) 
based on current prices. Despite the intention to raise prices to “European levels”, it is worth noting that most 
gas producing countries with which Russia must compete in a number of sectors have very low levels of gas 
“feedstock” prices. Th is factor may act to limit the scope for price rises in those sectors.
Th e establishment of a gas exchange in Russia, where up to 10 bcm is being sold at unregulated prices, 50% 
by Gazprom and 50% by independent producers, is an important step towards more market-based pricing in Rus-
sia’s domestic gas market. Prices on the gas exchange have been as high as USD 2.48/MBtu (USD 94/1,000 m3) 
compared to regulated gas prices of about USD 1.06/MBtu (USD 40/1,000 m3). As in IEA Europe, we believe 
that there are considerable beneﬁ ts to gas exchanges, which allow price transparency according to economic 
factors. Russia is making progress in improving gas sector regulation for market participants and working on 
installing a more eﬀ ective balancing regime. Improvement of modiﬁ ed entry/exit schemes and balancing regimes 
is an ongoing challenge in many IEA European gas markets.
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Conclusion
Russia is the world’s largest gas producer and exporter and the biggest reserve holder. In the current tight mar-
ket circumstances, it has never been more important to create the correct economic conditions within the Rus-
sian gas market. If conditions for independents can be improved, then Russian gas production will surely rise. 
If policymakers continue to gradually reform gas pricing, then eﬃ  ciency will improve as companies start to 
see the positive economics of investing in new plant and equipment. 
Nevertheless we remain worried about the overall level of investment in Russia which seems insuﬃ  cient to 
guarantee security of supply and hence will aﬀ ect security of demand. We therefore repeat our call for greater 
transparency in the sector, particularly with regard to investment in future production. It is clear that there 
has to be a steep change in Russian gas investment, given the costs and technical challenges for the next big 
gas provinces.
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Russian Investment Risk Leads to Global LNG Tightness
Source: lEA.
* Information from Supply/Demand section.
** Base case Russian Government Energy Strategy (2003) total projected exports to lEA Europe.
** Low case IEA scenario based on restrained investment.
Note: We have assumed total Russian exports per Russian Government Energy Strategy (2003) less 77 bcm of Russian gas ﬂ ows 
to countries other than OECD Europe for all future periods (Russia supplied 77 bcm to these countries in 2005). We assume that 
Chinese export plans made in 2006 do not form part of this 2003 Energy Strategy.
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Th e Russian Oil Industry between Foreign Investment and Domestic 
Interests
By Julia Kusznir and Heiko Pleines, Bremen
Abstract
As the world’s second biggest oil producer, Russia has proﬁ ted hugely from high world market prices for 
oil. In contrast to the gas industry, the Russian oil industry was privatized in the 1990s and the domes-
tic market for oil and oil products was liberalized. Foreign investors were allowed to play an important 
role in the development of the industry. However, at present the Russian leadership is aiming to increase 
state control over oil production and to focus on the development of the domestic market. Th is strat-
egy may hamper eﬃ  ciency.
Oil Production and Exports
Th ough Russia holds only 7 percent of worldwide proven oil reserves, the country has in recent years been the 
world’s second largest oil producer, ranking between Saudi Arabia and the USA. Russia’s oil production is likely 
to rise until the end of this decade. However, for the following decade many forecasts are pessimistic. Th ey see 
four main risks to production growth. First, known, accessible reserves are limited. Undiscovered oil reserves 
may be large, but their exploitation will be diﬃ  cult due to their remote location and unfavorable geological con-
ditions. Second, investment in exploration and production has declined in recent years. Th ird, onerous windfall 
proﬁ t taxes block rising world market prices from stimulating Russian oil production. Fourth, state ownership in 
the oil industry has been growing in recent years. Combined with restrictions on foreign investment, expanded 
state intervention poses a serious risk to eﬃ  ciency. 
Oil exports also face major challenges. Nearly two thirds of Russia’s oil exports go to the EU. However, the Rus-
sian government seeks a diversity of customers as a clear long-term aim. According to its energy strategy, exports 
to Europe will grow, but at a much slower pace than exports to Southeast Asia and North America. As a result, 
according to the targets, Europe’s share in Russian oil exports will decrease to about 50 percent by 2020, while 
the proportion sent to America and Asia will rise from 3 percent to about 30 percent. Th is diﬀ erent geographical 
focus implies not only a considerable rise in production, but also the realization of ambitious pipeline projects. 
Because of constraints on the existing export pipeline infrastructure, Russian exporters are forced to export over 
50 million tons of oil per year via more costly railroads and internal waterways. Using these forms of transporta-
tion increases costs by US$5 to US$7 per barrel.
Th e Domestic Market
Domestic prices for oil and oil products were liberalized in 1992 and, according to Russian legislation, they are 
not subject to regulation by the state. Th erefore, the state has only indirect inﬂ uence on prices. However, this indi-
rect inﬂ uence is considerable. First, the state owns some production companies and the operators of the oil and oil 
products pipelines. As a result, it can directly determine the price policy of some market players. Second, a large 
part of the prices of oil and oil products consists of taxes, which are also directly set by the state. Th ird, export 
tariﬀ s for oil and oil products set by the state have a direct inﬂ uence on the attractiveness of supplies to foreign vs. 
domestic markets. Fourth, the state can pressure the oil companies to lower their prices either formally through 
anti-monopoly investigations or informally through round table talks with leading managers to impose a tempo-
rary moratorium on prices increases.
Domestic prices for oil and oil products are set in a highly monopolistic environment. Th e privatization of the 
oil industry in the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s was based on regionally-concentrated, vertically-integrated oil compa-
nies. As a result, there are wholesale monopolists in many regions, which in turn determine retail prices, although 
independent retail traders have emerged in most regions. As the oil companies often collude with regional author-
ities, their dominant market position is often protected by regional administrations. According to an estimate by 
the Russian Anti-Monopoly Commission, the market for oil products is either monopolistic or oligopolistic in 
about two thirds of Russian regions.
Nevertheless an analysis by the Cambridge Energy Research Associates came to the following conclusions: 
“(1) domestic wholesale prices for reﬁ ned products are not excessive, but generally in line with export parity lev-
els (although gasoline is priced at a premium due to the tightness of the balance for high-octane material); and 
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(2) there is no evidence of monopoly rents in retail prices even in highly monopolized regions where a single com-
pany might control 75–85 percent of sales. We believe that the major factor causing the substantial increase in 
product prices within Russia is the upward pull exerted by international price trends. It also appears that the wide 
gap noticed between retail and wholesale prices in Russia can be largely attributed to the relatively high trans-
port costs of moving products over Russia’s vast geographical space from a relatively small number of reﬁ neries 
rather than monopoly rents per se.” (Cambridge Energy Research Associates: Russian Domestic Oil Price Out-
looks Workshop, April 2006)
Oil Reﬁ ning
In the 1990s, Russia’s major vertically-integrated oil companies focused on the upstream business, deriving most 
of their proﬁ ts from crude exports. Th e domestic market for oil and oil products was unattractive due to low 
prices and the inability of many customers to pay for the oil they consumed. In addition, high export tariﬀ s for 
oil products (meant to secure supplies for the domestic market) and tax levels rising in line with reﬁ ning depths, 
discouraged investment in reﬁ ning. 
Outdated reﬁ ning capacity was shut down rather than modernized. In the last ten years the aggregate capacity 
of Russian reﬁ neries dropped by nearly a ﬁ fth. Th e remaining reﬁ ning capacity is still in need of modernization. 
As a result of under-investment, the average depth of reﬁ ning in Russia does not exceed 73 percent, and output 
of light oil products is estimated at 55 percent (rates in the OECD are about 90 percent and 75 percent respec-
tively). Only ﬁ ve Russian reﬁ neries have a reﬁ ning depth of more than 80 percent. 
However, the outlook for Russian reﬁ ning is brightening fast. Demand for reﬁ ned products is rising domes-
tically and internationally, while at the same time margins for high-quality products from Russian reﬁ neries are 
rising faster than those for low-quality products. 
Domestic demand is rising rapidly due to increased consumer spending. Th e dynamic growth in car sales has led 
to growing demand for gasoline. Although gasoline use per car is expected to fall, the Russian Ministry of Indus-
try and Energy forecasts overall demand for gasoline to rise by a third by 2015. Since 1998 retail gasoline prices 
have risen much faster than average consumer prices, thus improving sales margins. Th e industry’s limited capac-
ity to produce high-octane gasoline for cars has led to a pricing premium in the domestic market for gasoline. 
At the same time, reﬁ ning margins have been rising worldwide, driven by a global move towards cleaner fuels. 
As utilization rates have risen, the long-distance trade in reﬁ ned products has become an important aspect of the 
business, increasing the international demand for Russian exports of oil products. As a result, the average capac-
ity utilization at Russian reﬁ neries has risen from about 65 percent in 2000 to about 80 percent in 2005, not too 
far below the average worldwide rate of 86 percent.
Th e Russian government has adjusted taxes and export tariﬀ s to favor domestic oil reﬁ ning. Since export tar-
iﬀ s were changed in 2005 to make exports of reﬁ ned products more attractive than crude exports, exports of oil 
products have soared, rising above 100 million metric tons (mmt) in 2006 and generating revenues of US$44 bil-
lion. In addition, tax levels are no longer rising in line with reﬁ ning depths. Accordingly proﬁ t margins for high 
quality products have become higher, thus encouraging investment in new production technology.
State Control over Strategically Important Sectors of the Economy
As the oil industry is one of Russia’s most important and most proﬁ table businesses, it has attracted considerable 
foreign investment. As a result Russia’s oil and gas production accounts for about a third of total foreign invest-
ment in the country. In addition, oil reﬁ ning contributes another 7 percent. Th e biggest foreign direct investors 
in the oil industry so far are the participants in the major Sakhalin production sharing agreement (PSA) projects 
(Sakhalin I and II), concluded in 1996, and British Petroleum, which merged its Russian activities with the Tyu-
men Oil Company (TNK) in 2003. Additionally, ConocoPhillips has entered the Russian oil industry through 
portfolio investments and now holds 20 percent of Lukoil. For an overview of foreign investment in the Russian 
oil industry, see Table 1 on page 35.
However, fears of a sellout to foreigners in strategic parts of the economy have always been a part of Russian 
political debates and often strike a chord with Russian voters. Th e population strongly opposes any foreign involve-
ment in strategic sectors of the economy and in the energy sector, in particular. Experts from the state sector, such 
as high-ranking bureaucrats from the relevant ministries and members of respective parliamentary commissions, 
are more open to foreign investment in general. But a majority of them speak out against foreign investment in 
the oil and gas industry (see Graph 1 on page 34).
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However, in the 1990s Russia did not pursue a consistent policy towards strategic sectors. On the one hand, 
this policy was part of a political struggle between liberal-minded reformers in the government and the commu-
nist/nationalist factions in parliament. On the other hand, the treatment of strategically important companies 
was often improvised according to speciﬁ c urgent needs, including ﬁ nancial ones.
Th e present economic boom has now made Russia under President Putin much more self-conﬁ dent. State pol-
icies currently seek to increase state control in strategic sectors of the economy mainly through ownership of big 
enterprises in these sectors, which are then united into a state holding company. Th rough this state holding com-
pany the state can then control the respective economic branch and inﬂ uence its development directly. State rep-
resentatives to company boards are state employees either from the responsible ministry or, in the case of chair-
people, sometimes with a secret service background.
What is not yet clear, and subject to controversial debate in Russia as well as internationally, is the way through 
which the state wants to acquire additional stakes in enterprises it considers to be of strategic importance and the 
extent to which the state wants to concentrate ownership in the respective sectors of the economy.
As far as the ways to increase state control are concerned, the Russian state has used both civilized and unciv-
ilized methods. While the former clearly prevail across the economy as a whole, the latter have received much 
greater publicity, particularly because of their application in the energy industry. In most cases the state does not 
directly acquire ownership, but rather acts through state-owned companies like Gazprom or Rosneft. 
Th e civilized method of increasing control over strategic sectors of the economy is to unite all state shares into 
one holding company and to let this holding buy additional stakes at market prices, as happened in the case of 
Sibneft. In addition, ownership by outside (and especially foreign) shareholders is restricted by legal means. 
Th e uncivilized method of increasing state control over strategically important enterprises is based on manip-
ulated allegations of legal wrongdoings (especially concerning tax, safety and environmental regulations), which 
lead to pressure in the form of bad publicity, oﬃ  ce searches and the conﬁ scation of company documents, frozen 
bank accounts, hefty ﬁ nes and the arrest of senior managers. Th is strategy is above all associated with the Yukos 
case. In addition, the Sakhalin II consortium was put under pressure in order to sell a stake to Gazprom. 
In summary, it seems that the state wants to increase its share in the oil industry considerably and rapidly, 
and therefore uses uncivilized measures, whereas in other branches of the economy deemed strategically impor-
tant, the state has used more civilized methods, such as creating a “national champion,” which will then be able 
to compete successfully with foreign investors in the longer run.
Th e second important question is how much control the state wants to get over these strategic sectors. Th is 
question has two aspects. First, how many enterprises can continue to operate without state ownership and sec-
ond, what will the role of private investors be in state-controlled companies? At present the state does not seem to 
have a clear answer to these questions. As a result, plans for diﬀ erent branches change rather rapidly, while con-
ﬂ icting concepts are being developed by diﬀ erent state agencies. State acquisitions of strategic enterprises often 
look improvised. A consistent framework may only emerge after the election period of 2007/08.
Conclusion
It should be noted, that in oil production the state’s share still stands below 50 percent, as Graph 2 on page 34 
indicates (though it may increase further if Surgutneftegaz is sold as persistent rumors have it). At the same time, 
shares of the state-owned Rosneft company have been issued through an IPO. Gazprom, the major gas company 
which now has acquired assets in oil production, is only 51 percent state-owned. Th is situation seems to indicate 
that, on the one hand, the state wants majority ownership in the major oil companies, but, on the other hand, 
loyal (majority Russian-owned) companies can continue to operate without the state as a shareholder and for-
eign investors can be active as (friendly) minority owners. However, the government’s present ideas about corpo-
rate governance suggest that the performance of Russian state-owned companies may serve to supply arguments 
in favor of private ownership.
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Graph 1: Th ere should be no foreign investment in this sector of the economy!
(Representative poll of the Russian population and expert poll of state actors, 2005 and 
2006)
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Graph 2: State’s share in oil production 1994 – 2006
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Table 1: Major foreign investments in Russia’s oil industry 1992–2006
Year Foreign investor and Russian partners Foreign investment Value
1992 Conoco (USA) –
joint venture with Lukoil (Russia) 
2003: + Rosneft (Russia)
50% stake in “Polar Lights” (exploration 
of Ardalinski Oilﬁ eld, Komi and Archan-
gelsk regions)
80 mn USD
1992 BASF/Wintershall AG (Germany) – 
joint venture with Lukoil (Russia)
50% stake in  Volgodeminoil  (oil pro-
duction in the Volgograd region)
na
1995 ARCO (USA) –
portfolio investment
8% stake in Lukoil –
sold back to Lukoil in 2001 
250 mn USD
1995 TotalFinaElf (France)
+ Norsk Hydro (Norway)
+ Lukoil (Russia)
+ Nenets Oil Company (Russia)
Kharyaga PSA
(oil production in the Nenets Autono-
mous Region)
2.5 bn USD over 
33 years
1996 ExxonMobil (USA)
+ Sodeco (Japan) 
+ Rosneft (Russia)
2001: + ONGC (India) – see below
Sakhalin I PSA
(oﬀ shore oil production in the Sakhalin 
region)
15 bn USD over 
33 years
1996 McDermott (Canada) until 1997
+ Marathon Oil (USA) until 2000 
+ Mitsubishi (Japan)
+ Mitsui (Japan) 
+ Shell (UK) 
2006: + Gazprom (Russia)
Sakhalin II PSA 
(oﬀ shore oil production in the Sakhalin 
region)
10 bn USD over 
25 years
1996 Royal Dutch/ Shell (Netherlands/UK) –
joint venture with OAO NK Evikhon 
(Russia), now a subsidiary of UK-based 
Sibir Energy plc
50% stake in Salym Petroleum Develop-
ment N.V. 
(development of the Salym group of oil-
ﬁ elds in Western Siberia)
Shell approved  a 
budget of more 
than 1 bn  USD 
1997 British Petroleum (UK) –
portfolio investment
10% stake in Sidanko 571mn USD
2001 ONGC (India) 20% stake in Sakhalin I (see 1996) 225 mn USD
2003 BP (UK) –
merger
50% stake in TNK-BP 6.75 bn USD
2003 BASF/Wintershall AG  (Germany) 70% stake in Megatron NVK 
(oﬀ shore exploration in Dagestan)
na
2004 ConocoPhillips (USA) –
portfolio investment
7.6% stake in Lukoil 1.98 bn USD
2005 ConocoPhillips (USA) –
portfolio investment
8.5% stake in Lukoil na
2005 ConocoPhillips (USA) –
joint venture with Lukoil (Russia)
30% stake in Naryanmarneftegaz
(development of parts of the Timan- 
Pechora Field, Komi and Archangelsk 
regions)
529 mn USD
2006 ConocoPhillips (USA) –
portfolio investment
3.9% stake in Lukoil na
Source: Research Centre for East European Studies, Bremen
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Power Politics: Electricity Sector Reforms in Post-Soviet Russia
By Susanne Wengle, Berkeley
Abstract
While eﬀ orts to exert greater state control over a number of sectors of the Russian economy have 
made headlines, the government is currently also proceeding with eﬀ orts to privatize large parts of 
the electricity sector. Since the beginning of attempts to liberalize, eﬀ ective opposition to these mea-
sures has changed: while in the 1990s, a variety of actors who reﬂ ected public concerns could nego-
tiate the terms of reform, today inﬂ uence is limited to a narrow elite of powerful insiders. Crucially, 
since about 2002 electricity sector liberalization has had the backing of President Putin and far-reach-
ing reforms have been implemented. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen who emerges as the new own-
ers of valuable power plants and if the plans to liberalize wholesale prices by 2011 will be realized in 
a post-Putin era. 
“Power Politics” and the Political Economy of Electricity Sector Reform
Th e Soviet-era state-controlled electricity monopoly “Uniﬁ ed Electricity System” (UES), whose origins lie in 
Lenin’s initiative to electrify the newly-founded Soviet Union, is currently being broken up and privatized. Rus-
sians old enough to remember the Soviet period are aware of the extraordinary economic, political and sym-
bolic importance of the electricity sector. Th e liberalization and privatization process has been marked from 
its onset by conﬂ icts over the immensely valuable assets as well as over the future of electricity provision more 
generally. Struggles over property rights and resources are never simply battles between reformers and resis-
tors, with one side pushing for change and the other blocking it. Th e stakes are high for a variety of actors: pol-
iticians at diﬀ erent levels of government, household and industrial consumers paying their bills and petition-
ing for subsidies, utilities negotiating their monopoly position in a changing regulatory environment, reform-
ers with visions of more eﬃ  ciency and lower prices – to name just a few. Multiple and shifting fault lines shape 
the conﬂ icts over electricity sector reforms. 
In what follows, I will sketch changing patterns of the political economy of electricity sector reform. Th e 
utility sector provides an interesting lens for understanding the post-Soviet period for several reasons. First, 
electricity is an important sector in a country with cold winters and energy ineﬃ  cient industries; the electric-
ity sector crisis and the proposed reforms have held public attention and generated stormy headlines for years. 
Second, Russia’s ongoing process of utility sector liberalization is at odds with accounts that portray the coun-
try as moving “backward” towards more statism. It also contrasts with widely publicized news in other energy 
sectors – the “re-nationalization” of Yukos and the ouster of foreign oil companies from key oil and gas ﬁ elds. 
An analysis of the patterns of conﬂ ict in the electricity sector illustrates that the dynamics of liberalization 
and privatization in the Russian economy vary across sectors. Finally, “power politics” mirrors some of the 
larger dynamics of post-Soviet political economy. Th e eﬀ ective opposition to reform has narrowed over time 
and become less representative: in the 1990s Duma deputies, regional governors, regionally-based industrial-
ists and mayors of important cities inﬂ uenced the trajectory of the sector; today the terms of reform are nego-
tiated among select elites close to the Putin administration.
Th e Aims of the Reforms: Unbundle, Restructure and Create Markets
Th e guiding principle of the electricity sector reforms, in Russia and elsewhere, has been to force utilities to 
operate more eﬃ  ciently and reduce prices for end users through the introduction of market forces. In order 
to create markets and competition, electricity sectors are being fundamentally restructured. For much of the 
20th century, vertically-integrated state-owned monopolies produced and distributed electricity throughout 
the world. While the global wave of electricity sector liberalization has taken shape in various ways in diﬀ erent 
countries beginning in the 1980s, restructuring typically involves undoing the vertically-integrated monop-
olies, isolating competitive segments from those that are considered natural monopolies. Th e unbundling of 
the diﬀ erent parts of the production chain restructures the sector into four segments: generation, transmis-
sion, distribution and retail. In generation and retail, reformers hope to introduce competition between inde-
pendent companies. In transmission and distribution, non-discriminatory access to grids is to be secured by a 
strong and independent regulator. Th e privatization of the generation and retail segments of the sector tends to 
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be a later step in the reforms – although in Russia, privatization of electricity assets started before the restruc-
turing of the sector.
In the Soviet Union, the “Uniﬁ ed Electricity System” was run by the Ministry of Energy and Electric-
ity, a hierarchically-organized bureaucracy directed from Moscow. Th e current reform process rests on a set 
of laws that were passed in 2002/2003. Earlier eﬀ orts to restructure the sector, starting in 1997, were largely 
futile. Th e ﬁ rst important step of the ongoing liberalization was the unbundling of the regional vertically-inte-
grated electricity companies, known as the “Energos” in 2004/2005. Reforms mandate the privatization of 
the bulk of generation assets by 2008, although the government always planned that hydro-electric genera-
tion would remain partly state-owned and nuclear power generation would remain fully state-owned. Prices 
are in the process of being liberalized, with full liberalization of wholesale prices planned for 2011. Transmis-
sion networks will remain state controlled, to be overseen by regulatory institutions that guarantee open and 
non-discriminatory access to the grid for all generators. Given that Russia had no experience with a privately-
owned and marketized electricity sector, legal and regulatory institutions that underpin the sector had to be 
built from scratch.
Th e Key Drivers of Structural Change: A Monopoly Orchestrates Its Own Demise
UES itself has been the main driver of the current reforms in Russia. UES and its subsidiaries produce about 
70 percent of Russia’s electricity, making it by far the largest electricity producer in Russia. It inherited most of 
the Soviet-era infrastructure in the sector via a 1992 presidential decree, including most power plants, trans-
mission and distribution networks, and many other related functions – repair and maintenance companies, 
research institutes, etc. Under the leadership of Anatoly Chubais, a highly skilled, though controversial, poli-
tician strongly committed to the introduction of market forces, the monopoly provider UES has been orches-
trating its own demise. 
While UES has been providing the impetus and many of the blueprints for reform proposals, the Duma, 
Presidential Administration and two key ministries have also been involved in power sector reforms. Victor 
Khristenko’s Ministry of Industry and Energy has been charged with the somewhat vague mandate of the “over-
all oversight of reforms.” German Gref ’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade monitors the macro-
economic and social impact of reforms, such as the eﬀ ect of tariﬀ  increases on living standards and inﬂ ation 
rates. At several points the Duma has played an active role in trying to shape the reform outcome. During the 
planning phase of the current reforms a Duma commission – led by Tomsk Oblast governor Viktor Kress – 
worked out a competing program to the UES plans, which involved less radical unbundling and allowed the 
state to maintain control of more generation assets. Nevertheless, the legislation that led to electricity-sector 
reforms was ultimately based on plans favored by UES, but the legislation ultimately adopted included hun-
dreds of amendments to the law initially proposed by Chubais.
Without the support of the president, the current reforms would not have been possible. Putin reversed 
his position on utility reform after coming to oﬃ  ce. In early 2000, then Prime Minister Putin sharply criti-
cized Chubais for wanting to hike electricity tariﬀ s and joined eﬀ orts to remove him from the chairmanship 
of UES. By the end of 2002, however, Putin had sided with the reformers and by 2003 signed the legislative 
package that came to serve as the basis for reform. Since then electricity has been grouped with other infra-
structure sectors, such as railways, telecoms and ﬁ nancial services that have been liberalizing over the last few 
years. Th e faction of liberal reformers among Putin-era elites, including Gref, Kudrin and Chubais, prevailed 
over opponents of reforms. Th ey justiﬁ ed the need for reform with the logic that liberalization and privatiza-
tion are prerequisites to attract capital for infrastructure investment, which in turn they present as a necessary 
condition to reach Putin’s 2004 growth target of doubling GDP by 2010.
Who Opposes Liberalization? Narrowing Circles of “Relevant” Opponents
Changing coalitions of various social and economic groups have opposed structural changes in the electric-
ity sector. Th e most threatening opposition to Chubais’ vision of a liberalized electricity market has narrowed 
over time, and, arguably, become less representative of public opinion. In the 1990s, the most vocal and pow-
erful opponents included Duma deputies, the regional governors and regionally-based industrialists, often the 
incumbent beneﬁ ciaries of the UES empire. In contrast, in recent years the relevant opponents are concen-
trated closer to the president. 
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A comparison of the two reforms attempts – one in 1997 that largely failed and one after 2003 that has so 
far succeeded – reveals how much the actors and the contours of the conﬂ icts in the sector have shifted. UES 
tried to liberalize and restructure the electricity sector for the ﬁ rst time in 1997. At that time, the fragmenta-
tion of bureaucratic authority and the economic crisis inherited from the late 1980s and early 1990s set the 
context for reforms. Th e central government in Moscow was struggling to assert political authority and many 
regional governors managed to control assets and tariﬀ -setting institutions in the electricity sector in the early 
and mid-1990s. Governors were keeping electricity tariﬀ s low to subsidize regional industrial elites, gain legiti-
macy among constituencies and assert their independence from the central government. Subsidy arrangements 
for industrial users varied across regions, depending, for example, on the dominant industry and its relations 
with the regional governments. In many regions, UES’ reform attempts in the late 1990s were thus unwel-
come: the reformist vision of what should happen with the sector – unbundling the regional, vertically-inte-
grated monopoly, creating wholesale markets for electricity and other liberalization measures – threatened the 
basis of the subsidy arrangement among the troika of regional governors, regional electricity companies (Ener-
gos) and regional industrialists.
Th e opponents of reforms thus outnumbered supporters by far. When Chubais took the chairmanship of 
UES in 1998, a broad coalition of opponents rallied against electricity sector reforms, which included Duma 
deputies, and inﬂ uential political actors like Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Boris Berezovsky, who con-
trolled Russia’s most important television network at the time. A coalition of Duma deputies tried to stop UES’ 
plans by removing Chubais: over 60 motions seeking to remove him from the leadership of UES came to a 
vote between 1998 and 2004 (when the Duma became dominated by United Russia). Communist deputies, 
opposed to the sale of state property, were joined by other opponents of reforms and those who opposed Chu-
bais personally, such as the Yabloko party. 
During the Putin-era centralization of power, the opposition by regional elites, the Energos, the governors 
and industrialists was broken or co-opted. Since 2004, the Duma has been dominated by United Russia dep-
uties, who have loyally followed the Kremlin’s position on infrastructure reforms. Th e most threatening oppo-
nents to Chubais’ plans to fully liberalize the electricity sector are now positioned not in the regions or in the 
legislature, but close to the presidential apparatus. Some key members of the Presidential Administration envis-
age something like a Gazprom-led energy empire and are not in favor of selling UES’ assets to a broader inves-
tor base that includes foreign strategic and portfolio investors. 
Reforms in the electricity sector are thus still contested, but the fault lines of the conﬂ ict are no longer 
aligned with the opponents and proponents of privatization (although Chubais tends to frame the conﬂ ict in 
this way – calling his opponents supporters of “Goskapitalism”). Instead, the debate centers on the question 
of whether electricity should be classiﬁ ed as a “strategic sector,” which would provide a rationale to exclude 
foreigners and give a larger role to Russian companies, including Gazprom. Gazprom has been trying to buy 
electricity sector assets. It is not yet clear to what extent the enormously powerful gas monopoly will be able 
to control the sector. (Gazprom presents itself as a proﬁ t-oriented private company, but most observers think 
of it as basically an arm of the government.) State support for vertically-integrated “national champions” that 
can compete internationally is clearly on the agenda in a number of other sectors. Electricity, so far, is con-
sidered an infrastructure sector, where competition and foreign investment are ultimately needed to support 
the growth of the Russian economy as a whole. Even if Gazprom can secure assets, unlike previous rounds of 
privatization, it will probably have to oﬀ er a high-enough price to outbid other interested parties. Yet, the clas-
siﬁ cation of utilities as a “non-strategic” industry may be short-lived. Opponents to the involvement of foreign 
investors have successfully used the argument that electricity is strategic to keep the St. Petersburg generation 
company reserved for Russian investors. 
Does public opinion matter for the progress of reforms? Following price increases and frequent electricity 
black outs in some regions, Russia saw a wave of protests against electricity reforms around 2001. Ordinary 
Russians are clearly vulnerable to changes in the sector: over half (57%) of the respondents to a recent sur-
vey by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) said that the increase in utility prices has greatly aﬀ ected their 
lives, and about a third (33%) said they will have to adapt spending patterns or ﬁ nd additional income sources. 
Currently, in the run-up to presidential elections, the government is committed to not letting electricity prices 
increase too quickly; gradual price increases up to full liberalization in 2011 are planned. A gradual approach 
is to a large extent motivated by a concern about the inﬂ ationary eﬀ ect of price liberalization, though it is prob-
ably also partly the result of fears of a popular backlash against sharp price hikes. It remains to be seen if any 
of the parties in the Duma will articulate opposition to price hikes in the future. Representation under Putin 
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is in many ways deeply ﬂ awed: at a time when opposition to increasing utility prices and the hatred of Chu-
bais and his schemes is at a high, the circle of actors able to shape the reforms in the sector has narrowed to a 
small group of elites in Moscow.
Prospects for Reforms: Two Open Questions – Who Will Be the New Owners and How 
Will Price Liberalization Progress?
Th e structural change in the power sector over the last ﬁ ve years has been substantial: vertically-integrated 
regional monopolies have been broken up, generation companies are in the process of being privatized, a whole-
sale market for power has been created with a non-proﬁ t organization that administers trading, and lastly, the 
regulatory institutions of the electricity sector have been re-organized to deal with the marketization of the 
sector. Finally, since the culmination of Chubais’ plan is the abolition of vertically-integrated monopolies, the 
UES reform plan seeks to liquidate all UES assets by 2008.
It is highly unlikely that the restructuring of the vertically-integrated monopolies into horizontal holding 
companies will be reversed. And it is probable that the government stake in generation assets will be signiﬁ cantly 
reduced, which will mean a de facto privatization of generation. Th is is currently happening through the pub-
lic issue of equity stakes, which are intended to raise capital for future investments, but simultaneously reduce 
UES’ stake – and therefore state ownership – in generation companies. It is also likely that the share of liber-
alized transactions and contracts on the wholesale markets will gradually increase over the next few years. It is 
not clear at this point, however, who will be allowed to acquire the shares of generation companies – domestic 
or foreign, industrial or energy interests – and how much competition will be created. Nor is it clear if the gov-
ernment will stick to its current commitment to fully liberalize wholesale electricity markets by 2011.
Conclusion: Who Determines the Price of Power in the Future?
What does this analysis of the electricity sector tell us about the overall direction of reforms in the Russian 
economy? Th e circle of relevant opponents to liberalization has changed over time; more precisely, it has nar-
rowed and arguably become less representative. In the 90s, actors who could shape reform policies included 
Duma deputies, regional governors and regional industrialists. Today, struggles about reform outcomes are 
mostly fought out among elite actors who either favor state control in the energy sectors or believe that market 
mechanisms can make energy production more eﬃ  cient. Th e question of how the price of power will be deter-
mined in the future – by markets, technocrats, politicians or industrial consumers – remains open. It is clear, 
however, that the outcome of the current large-scale change in the sector will crucially aﬀ ect the cost of living 
and the cost of producing and will thus be reﬂ ected in some way in every Russian’s life. 
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“Have Your Utility Bills for 2006 Grown Compared to 2005? If so, Has the Rise in 
Utility Prices Had a Signiﬁ cant or an Insigniﬁ cant Negative Eﬀ ect on Your Life?”
7%
4%
18%
6%
7%
57%
I do not use public utilities
My utility bills have not
increased
The rise in utility bills has
had a significant negative
effect on my life
The rise in utility bills has
had an insignificant
negative effect on my life
The rise in utility bills has
had no effect on my life
Difficult to say
Source: FOM opinion survey conducted on December 16–17 2006, 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/projects/dominant/dominan2006/dom0650/domt0650_1/d065010
“What Do You Intend to Do About the Rise in Utility Prices?” (Only Th ose Who 
Answered that the Rise in Utility Prices Has Had a Signiﬁ cant Negative Eﬀ ect on Th eir 
Lives)
24%
18%
15%
6%
5%
2%
1%
0%
1%
4%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
I do not intend to do anything about this
I will save (on transport, clothing, food)
I will look for additional income
I will use public utilities less
I will apply for a subsidy for public utilities
I will take part in protests
I will take legal action or complain to the local authorities
I won't pay for public utilities
Other
Difficult to say
Source: FOM opinion survey conducted on December 16–17 2006, 
http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/projects/dominant/dominan2006/dom0650/domt0650_1/d065010
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UES is the Largest Russian Company Generating and Transmitting Electricity. Do You 
Know, Have You Heard, or Are You Hearing for the First Time that the Government is 
Planning to Reform UES?
14%
27%
56%
3%
I know of this
I heard something
about this
I am hearing this
for the first time
Difficult to say
UES is a System of Electric Power Stations, Transmission Grids, Distribution Networks 
and Dispatching Organizations. As Part of the Reforms it is Planned to Transfer Electric 
Power Stations to Independent Producers and Private Companies. What is Your Attitude 
towards this – Positive, Indiﬀ erent or Negative?
7%
13%
12%
68%
Positive
Difficult to say
Indifferent
Negative
Th e Proposed Reform of UES will allow the Transfer of Electric Power Stations to 
Foreign Private Companies. What is Your Attitude towards this – Positive, Indiﬀ erent or 
Negative?
4%
13%
10%
73%
Positive
Difficult to say
Indifferent
Negative
Attitudes of the Russian Public towards the Privatization of UES
Source: FOM opinion survey conducted on June 30 – July 1 2007, http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/d072727

Part II: Russia’s New Energy Frontiers

Shtokman and Russia’s Arctic Petroleum Frontier
By Indra Øverland, Oslo
Abstract
Th e need to develop new sources of natural gas to supply domestic and foreign customers is push-
ing Gazprom into the Arctic. Two key Arctic projects could, at least in theory, become the com-
pany’s and the country’s new mainstays: Shtokman and Yamal. Th e realistic time-scales, cost 
frames and sources of ﬁ nancing for these two projects remain highly unclear. It is also unclear 
whether the projects will be developed in parallel or sequentially. So far, however, there has been 
far more organizational stir surrounding the Shtokman ﬁ eld, which is therefore the main topic 
of this article. Th e Shtokman ﬁ eld is located close to the Norwegian border in the Barents Sea, 
and the Norwegian oil major StatoilHydro has been selected as one of the two main foreign part-
ners for the project. Th e development of the project therefore has implications for Russian–Nor-
wegian relations in the north, which are also discussed in this paper.
Russian Gas Production and the Eurasian Energy Balance
Events in Ukraine in January 2006 and Belarus in January 2007 fuelled worries in some circles about Rus-
sia’s reliability as a supplier to European markets. More recently, concerns have shifted to whether Russia 
will be able to supply its customers, even if it wants to. Th e supply crunch is envisaged as occurring sometime 
between 2010 and 2012. Th ese fears revolve around Western Siberia’s Nadym Pur Taz Region and its three 
super-giant ﬁ elds: Medvezhe, Urengoy and Yamburg. Over 90 percent of Russia’s natural gas is extracted 
in Nadym Pur Taz, but production in the region is falling fast. Th e ﬁ elds have all been producing for over 
20 years (37 in the case of Medvezhe), and injection techniques applied during the Soviet period to boost 
output have shortened their life span and steepened the production decline. At the same time, Russia’s econ-
omy is expanding and natural gas remains heavily under-priced. As a consequence, domestic consumption is 
increasing. Foreign customers and Russian pundits are left wondering where the gas is going to come from 
in the future, and the simplest answer is Shtokman and/or Yamal.
Th e Russian Arctic and World Energy Supplies
In a widely cited survey, the US Geological Survey estimated that up to 25 percent of the world’s undiscovered 
oil and gas may be located in the Arctic. What is less often noted is that a large part of these resources are located 
in the Russian part of the Arctic. Th is is not just because almost half of the Arctic littoral is Russian, but also 
because the seabed along Russia’s Arctic coast includes some of the biggest ﬁ nds ever in the Arctic, some of the 
most promising areas, and some of the least explored areas. Th us, Shtokman and Yamal are the gateways to an 
Arctic Russian adventure that could satisfy a substantial part of the world’s future oil and gas demand.
Shtokman versus Yamal 
Shtokman is located in North-Western Russia, close to the Nordic countries. Yamal is located further east in 
the Asian part of Russia. Choosing between the two projects therefore has implications not only for Russia’s 
internal economic geography, but also for the proximity and linkages to the Nordic countries, the EU and 
overseas markets (for LNG).
A commonplace perception of the Russian natural gas industry is that it is relatively well-equipped to build 
pipelines and carry out other operations onshore, its main tasks during the Soviet period. It is also thought 
that, whether the Russian actors admit it or not, the industry is woefully inexperienced and incompetent when 
it comes to oﬀ shore operations. Th is shortcoming has occasionally been cited as a reason why Russian indus-
trial actors would prefer Yamal to be given priority over Shtokman.
In a seminal article from 2006 on Russia’s Arctic petroleum sector, Arild Moe casts the choice between 
Shtokman and Yamal as battle between diﬀ erent groups within Russia’s petroleum sector and within Gazprom. 
At the time, it appeared that the West Siberian lobby had won in pushing for Yamal and that it was unlikely 
any Western companies would be invited to participate in the project at all. Shtokman’s current advantage over 
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Yamal, however tenuous, probably does not indicate that the Western Siberian lobby has ﬁ nally been defeated, 
nor does it reﬂ ect a particular urge to cooperate with Western countries. Rather, it could be an implicit recog-
nition that it is better to go for a project where the capital, technology, and (not least) organizational skills of 
Western companies can play a central role. Bringing in Western partners may help the project move forward, 
and if it does not, there will be more companies to share the blame.
Yamal
Th e Yamal Peninsula, along with the Kara Sea, into which the peninsula juts, likely holds over 30 trillion cubic 
meters of gas, enough to supply the whole world for a decade. Like Shtokman, however, Yamal involves daunt-
ing challenges. Railways and proper roads are non-existent. Melting and refreezing of the ground on the pen-
insula pose even more daunting challenges, since these changes may literally undermine transport infrastruc-
ture, gas extraction and treatment facilities, and living quarters built for workers. Any onshore gas extraction 
would infringe on the large-scale reindeer herding operations of the indigenous peoples of the region. Finally, 
the cost of fully developing the Yamal ﬁ elds would be on the order of hundreds of billions of dollars and could 
take up to 50 years.
On the other hand, Yamal is relatively conveniently located in relation to Russia’s existing pipelines from 
Nadym Pur Taz to its domestic and foreign markets. Th e accelerated ice melting currently observed in the Arctic 
Ocean, which far outpaces the estimates of the relatively conservative International Panel on Climate Change, 
also opens interesting opportunities for LNG/marine transportation and for the oﬀ shore ﬁ elds.
While Yamal is bigger and in many ways more attractive to Russian actors than Shtokman, it is the latter 
that seems to be progressing fastest at the moment – however unpredictable that progress is. Th e rest of this 
article therefore focuses on Shtokman. 
Shtokman
Th e Shtokman gas and condensate ﬁ eld is the largest oﬀ shore gas ﬁ eld in the world. It was discovered in 1988 
and was recently re-estimated by Gazprom to contain 3.8 trillion cubic meters of gas and 31 million tons of 
condensate (previous estimates had usually been on the order of 3.2 trillion cubic meters of gas). It is located 
555 km north of the Kola Peninsula, in the Russian part of the Barents Sea. Although smaller than Yamal, 
Shtokman contains more than twice as much natural gas as Canada’s total known reserves.
For several years after they were included in a Gazprom shortlist, the oil companies Chevron, Conoco-
Phillips, Hydro, Statoil and Total vied to acquire ownership stakes in the Shtokman ﬁ eld. In Norway, where 
the project has received a lot of attention, the result was a rollercoaster of rising expectations and subsequent 
disappointment as uncoordinated statements and accidental signals from the Russian side fuelled rumors and 
media speculation on the Norwegian side that a decision was imminent, or that one or both of the Norwegian 
companies might be awarded a signiﬁ cant stake, or that the game was over and no foreign companies would 
be included. In their endeavor to join the project, the two Norwegian companies had extensive support from 
the Norwegian government and diplomatic apparatus. 
In July 2007 it was announced that the French oil company Total had been awarded a 25 percent stake in 
the joint company that is to develop the ﬁ rst phase of Shtokman. It had long been clear that Gazprom would 
retain 51 percent ownership, so the ﬁ nal competition for the remaining 24 percent was between StatoilHydro 
and ChevronTexaco. To some extent this was a competition between Norwegian technology and good-neigh-
borly relations in the North on the one hand, and US markets and big-power partnership on the other hand. 
StatoilHydro won the last 24 percent of the ﬁ eld on 24 October 2007.
It is important to understand the nature of the legal solution chosen for the inclusion of foreign companies 
in the Shtokman project. Total and StatoilHydro have not been awarded ownership of the ﬁ eld itself, but of 
parts of the company that will develop the ﬁ eld. Th is has resulted in a discussion about whether the two com-
panies can count Shtokman as part of their reserves. Th e diﬃ  culties of replacing reserves is the main driver 
for Western companies to become involved in the Russian petroleum sector in spite of the diﬃ  culties already 
experienced by foreign companies in projects such as Sakhalin-II, Kovykta and Kharyaga. Th erefore Total and 
StatoilHydro are ﬁ ghting hard for Shtokman to be fully recognized as part of their reserves by international 
ﬁ nancial markets and on international stock exchanges.
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Another important aspect of the deals that have been made is that they are more like options than own-
ership stakes. During the coming year or two Gazprom and the two foreign companies will attempt to ham-
mer out the technical and ﬁ nancial details of the Shtokman project, which are far from clear at the moment. 
In 2009 Total and StatoilHydro are to decide whether they want to make use of their right to a quarter each of 
the project under the conditions which they must negotiate with Gazprom. In spite of the symbolic and polit-
ical weight of the project and its importance for international cooperation and European energy security, this 
will ultimately have to be a business decision. It is worth remembering that perhaps the most disruptive point 
in the bumpy negotiations leading up to the decision to include Total and StatoilHydro was the distribution 
of the ﬁ nancial burden and risks between the Russian and Western sides. Th ere is no guarantee that Total and 
Statoil, as the company will then most likely have been renamed, will ﬁ nd the terms oﬀ ered suﬃ  ciently attrac-
tive when a decision is to be made in 2009.
Th e Importance of the Shtokman Field
Th e Shtokman ﬁ eld is now oﬃ  cially slated for production in 2013, though few believe it will be possible to stay 
within this timeframe or even near it. Should the project nonetheless develop according to schedule, it would 
both be the biggest energy-related event and the most important international cooperation project in northern 
Europe in the decade 2010–2020. Th ere are several reasons for its importance:
(1) Th e Shtokman ﬁ eld theoretically contains enough gas to satisfy the entire consumption of the EU for 
seven years. In addition to Shtokman’s direct importance for European energy supplies and security, it is impor-
tant for Europe because it includes the French oil company Total, and because it involves cooperation between 
Europe’s biggest and third biggest external suppliers of natural gas – Russia and Norway (which jointly sup-
ply 65 per cent of EU imports). Russia and Norway are also respectively the world’s second and third biggest 
oil exporters, and from this perspective the cooperation is also an interesting development in the global petro-
leum sector. It should not, however, be interpreted as a precursor to a Russian-Norwegian led gas cartel, as all 
of Norway’s main political parties seem to be ﬁ rmly committed to avoiding the politicization of Norwegian 
energy exports.
(2) Shtokman has widely been seen as driver of Russian–Norwegian cooperation across the border and of 
a joint Russian-Norwegian regional industrial boom in the High North, including northern Sweden and Fin-
land. Expectations have run particularly high in northern Norway, where hopes for a petroleum boom with 
Shtokman at its centre have injected dynamism and optimism after decades of Cold War confrontation and 
unemployment in the ﬁ sheries. One of the most optimistic visions for the development of the region includes 
the so-called “Pomor Zone,” a joint Norwegian-Russian industrial and economic cooperation zone straddling 
the border near Kirkenes. 
(3) Norwegian-Russian cooperation in the development of the Shtokman ﬁ eld has occasionally been cast 
as a possible precursor to a solution of the Norwegian–Russian border dispute in the Barents Sea. It is widely 
thought that the disputed area may include large petroleum resources, although the two parties have agreed to 
place a moratorium on exploration in the area. Due to the sensitivity of the topic, it is not possible to acquire 
reliable oﬃ  cial information about the border negotiations, but several possible solutions have been discussed 
by people outside the negotiation process. One of these assumes that successful Norwegian-Russian coopera-
tion on Shtokman could provide a precedent for a solution of the border dispute involving extensive cooper-
ation in the formerly disputed area. According to this solution, the parties would ﬁ rst have to agree on a new 
borderline in the disputed area. Once the border were decided upon, the resources in the Norwegian part of 
the formerly disputed area could be owned 51 percent by Norway, and 49 percent by Russia, whereas those in 
the Russian part of the formerly disputed area could be owned 51 percent by Russia and 49 percent by Nor-
way. Obviously such a solution would require a high degree of cooperation and coordination between the two 
countries, which could – it is thought – be demonstrated through successful cooperation on Shtokman. Due 
to the closed nature of the negotiation process, it is not possible to ascertain whether such a solution is on the 
table. But the fact that it is discussed outside the negotiation process does say much about the importance for 
Norwegian-Russian cooperation ascribed to Shtokman.
(4) Developing the Shtokman ﬁ eld also involves making diﬃ  cult choices about the marketing and trans-
portation solution for the gas. Th e three main options are: (a) to build a liquefaction plant on the coast of the 
Kola Peninsula (most likely at the derelict ﬁ shing village of Teriberka) and export the gas as LNG by ship, (b) 
to build a pipeline from Murmansk to the Petersburg area and connect it to the Nord Stream pipeline going to 
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Germany or (c) to lay a pipeline southwards through the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea and halfway down 
the Norwegian coast to connect with the Norwegian pipeline network. To some extent decision-making about 
Shtokman is thus also decision-making about whom Russia is going to trade and cooperate with internation-
ally. Option (a) – exporting the Shtokman gas as LNG – is often thought of as synonymous with exporting it 
to the US, but the LNG could also be shipped to Europe. One of the advantages of an LNG solution is there-
fore that it gives some ﬂ exibility as far as the export market is concerned, although buyers would obviously 
need the appropriate terminals for receiving the LNG. So far it seems the preferred solution is (a) (LNG), later 
to be combined with (b) (a pipeline connection with Nord Stream). Solution (c) (connecting Shtokman with 
the Norwegian pipeline network) may be mostly wishful Norwegian thinking. Although it could make sense 
in some practical respects, it is hardly a politically or economically attractive option for Russia.
Lessons Learned from the Shtokman Experience
Above all, the many phases of hope, ambition and disappointment in Western attempts to become involved 
in Shtokman illustrate how Western actors often intensively debate cooperation with Russia on the basis of all 
kinds of assumptions and expectations, without in fact engaging properly with signiﬁ cant Russian actors or 
being in touch with the reality on the Russian side. In this respect it is interesting to compare Shtokman with 
Norway’s Integrated Management Plan for the Barents Sea, which also involves great ambitions for involving 
Russian actors in environmental processes and solutions that rest on uniquely Norwegian and Western per-
spectives and assumptions.
Th e oﬃ  cial reason most often mentioned by Russian actors for the initial decision to exclude all foreign 
actors from the Shtokman project was that none of the suitors made suﬃ  ciently attractive oﬀ ers. If one takes 
this argument seriously, the Shtokman case indicates that ultimately ﬁ nancial considerations and proﬁ t may 
be the main driver in Russian energy cooperation with Western countries.
On the other hand, the politicization of the Shtokman negotiations, with multiple meetings between Rus-
sian and foreign politicians and high-level state functionaries, indicates that while business is important for the 
Russian side, business is controlled by politics. Western actors who want to cooperate will need the support of 
suﬃ  ciently strong politicians on the Russian side.
Th e development of the Shtokman ﬁ eld provides yet another illustration of the importance and sensitivity 
of strategic resources to the Kremlin – which is determined to stay in control. Th ese Kremlin priorities are also 
mirrored in other developments in Russian-Western energy cooperation, where Russia has been taking back 
control from Western companies that bought into Russian ﬁ elds in the 1990s. On the other hand, because the 
legal-institutional infrastructure for the Shtokman ﬁ eld is being developed under the full control of a sober 
Kremlin from the outset, cooperative relations may prove more stable, and it will be more diﬃ  cult for the Rus-
sian authorities to unilaterally blame problems on Western partners, though the pain of industrial delays and 
cost overruns may provide strong incentives to attempt to do so.
All discussion about Shtokman and other major petroleum developments in the North is generally discon-
nected from the EU’s Northern Dimension, Barents cooperation, the Arctic Council and other multilateral 
frameworks for cooperation. One could get the impression that cuddly multilateral cooperation is acceptable, 
as long as it does not deal with the really big issues, which are handled in bilateral or narrow ad hoc multilat-
eral settings. Th is situation may in particular be due to Russian preferences and Russia’s image of itself on the 
international stage (not as one country among others, but as an exceptional case) or to hardcore Russian real-
ism in international relations. In that case it may be questionable whether the West in the short run can really 
lull Russia into full-hearted participation in a multilateral framework such as the Energy Dialogue, the North-
ern Dimension or other multilateral options that are available, while buying its resources at the bargain prices 
that importing countries expect. 
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All Quiet on the Eastern Front… 
By Nina Poussenkova, Moscow
Abstract
A priority of Russia’s energy policy is to diversify oil and gas exports, which are currently focused on 
the stagnating European markets, by entering the Asian energy market and accessing consumers as far 
away as the US. Since the ﬁ elds of West Siberia are all mature and declining, Russia needs to develop 
new oil and gas ﬁ elds in East Siberia and the Far East, which are located closer to potential customers 
in Asia. Th e imperative to “turn east” is also determined by Russia’s urge to revitalize its eastern ter-
ritories and is thus in line with a broader national security agenda to develop a region which was long 
neglected. Geopolitically, Russia needs to build new relations with China, India and other countries 
of the Asia-Paciﬁ c region (APR). Th erefore, an eastern energy strategy will have to cope with a tan-
gled web of economic, social, political and geopolitical considerations.
Eastern Oildorado
East Siberia and the Far East have 13.5 percent of Russia’s total initial oil reserves and 19 percent of gas reserves. 
Resource estimates for East Siberia and the Far East vary between 15 billion and 22 billion tons of oil and 35 
thousand cubic meters (tcm) and 61 tcm of gas. Th e lion’s share is located in remote Arctic regions and will not 
be in demand for 20–30 years. Russia’s east is poorly explored: the average density of drilling there is 2 meters 
of deep wells per 1 sq km, while the Russian average is 23 meters per 1 sq km. Since all discoveries were made 
in the pre-1991 socialist era, modern prospecting technologies might identify many more reserves. For exam-
ple, Petromir booked the major Angaro-Lensk gas ﬁ eld in the Irkutsk Region in 2007.
Production estimates vary enormously. Th e Energy Strategy of Russia up to 2020 forecasts 3 million tons/
year (mt/yr) of crude under a critical scenario by 2020, and 80 mt/yr under an optimistic scenario. Given their 
enormous range, these predictions seem closer to educated guesses than data-based conclusions.
Th is issue has political connotations, since competing governmental agencies oﬀ er diﬀ erent views. Th e 
Ministry of Natural Resources is optimistic, anticipating production of 30 mt/yr of oil and 50 bcm of gas in 
the nearest future, while railroad representatives doubt that crude output in East Siberia will increase from the 
current 0.5 to 30 mt by 2011. Th eir skepticism is determined by a desire to promote oil deliveries to China by 
rail rather than through new pipelines. 
Oil in East Siberia is sweet and light and could be sold at a higher price than the traditional Urals export 
blend. Additionally, major eastern gas ﬁ elds contain valuable products for the gas chemical industry. Despite 
these attractions, oil and gas exploration and production in this greenﬁ eld province will be very expensive 
because of harsh climatic conditions, diﬃ  cult geology and lack of infrastructure. 
Russian academician Alexei Kontorovich from the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
estimates that developing east Siberian oil will require an investment of $87 billion. When expenditures for 
creating social infrastructure and general-purpose industrial facilities are factored in, the sums become awe-
inspiring. Th e government intends to shift the ﬁ nancial burden of creating the eastern petroleum industry 
onto the companies, and, despite the windfall oil revenues that Russia enjoys today, its domestic funds might 
not be enough.
Th ough ﬁ nancially the eastern petroleum project seems too challenging, it is not a purely commercial 
endeavor since it has serious political implications. Th e problems that the region faces jeopardize Russia’s secu-
rity, and they stem both from the socialist legacy and the turbulent transition period. 
Territory of our Discontent
East Siberia and the Far East are plagued by economic and social problems, including slow growth, the obso-
lescence of ﬁ xed assets, a “colonial” type of development, underinvestment in production facilities, an on-
going energy crisis, environmental degradation, general poverty, a great social disparity among regions, a lack 
of transportation infrastructure, and the absence of trunk pipelines to move oil and gas. 
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Demographic problems in the East threaten Russia’s national security. In 1989–2002, the population of the 
Far East declined by 16 percent, compared to 4 percent for Russia as a whole. Th e average population density 
is 2.1 persons per sq km in East Siberia and 1.1 in the Far East. Th ere is an acute shortage of manpower com-
bined with illegal immigration from neighboring countries. Th e situation particularly deteriorated after 1991, 
when Moscow largely forgot about East Siberia and the Far East. 
All the King’s Horses, all the King’s Men…
Now Moscow is changing its attitude to its “eastern stepchild.” In 2006 President Vladimir Putin described 
the situation in the Far East as “a threat to national security” and stressed the need “to invest money in the Far 
East.” As a result, the federal government is now compiling a targeted aid program entitled Th e Development 
of the Far East and the Trans-Baikal Region up to 2013. 
Th e Kremlin is taking practical steps to transform these backward territories. First, the government is com-
bining several of the regions in this part of Russia, creating fewer and larger entities, presumably to strengthen 
Moscow’s control over them. 
Second, the Kremlin is using the power it took in 2004 to appoint governors to carry out a major personnel 
reshuﬄ  e. Th e result is the appointment of a new regional leadership with either a St. Petersburg background 
or unquestioned loyalty to the Kremlin.
Th e third line of activities involves engaging big business in the solution of the region’s social and economic 
problems through the fashionable use of public-private partnerships. 
Simultaneously, the government is promoting oil and gas development in the East through ﬁ scal innova-
tions, as additional tax beneﬁ ts are required to attract investors. Changes in the Russian tax code concerning 
diﬀ erentiation of the mineral production tax are being considered, as well as tax holidays for greenﬁ eld terri-
tories, including in East Siberia and the Far East. 
 Also, eﬀ orts to modernize the Subsurface Law are underway; amendments to it are being discussed that are 
largely aimed at limiting the involvement of foreign majors in the development of Russian strategic deposits.
All the eastern challenges are clearly reﬂ ected in the problems of the East Siberia – Paciﬁ c Ocean (ESPO) oil 
pipeline, which should carry oil from East Siberia to the coast. Because this is a project where political consid-
erations have so far prevailed over economic feasibility, ESPO is often compared to the Baikal-Amur Mainline 
(BAM), a gigantic railroad project that became a stillborn child of socialism. Th e construction of ESPO’s ﬁ rst 
stage will probably be delayed, mainly because the pipeline was rerouted by some 400 km north of Lake Bai-
kal. Th e deadlines for the second stage have yet to be determined. According to Transneft, everything depends 
on how quickly the oilmen can explore and develop eastern oil ﬁ elds. 
Th e risk factors for ESPO are signiﬁ cant. Since the proved reserves of East Siberia are relatively small, no 
one knows the true size of the resource base in the region. Another problem is connected with ESPO’s compe-
tition with the Russian Railways, an important transporter of crude in Russia’s east. Some groups in the gov-
ernment wish to revitalize BAM, which can be used to transport oil.
Also, the price tag for the ﬁ rst stage of the project has already gone from $6.65 billion to $11 billion because 
of the longer path for the rerouted pipeline and higher costs. Th e greater outlays will result in higher tariﬀ s for 
transporting the oil, which raises questions about whether ESPO will be viable commercially. 
Who is the Mightiest of Th em All?
Until recently, state companies were poorly represented in the East, where private actors dominated the petro-
leum landscape. Gazprom had no presence in the region, while Rosneft, though owning eastern assets, was too 
weak to be considered a serious player.
Th e desire of the Kremlin to control the strategic sectors of the economy will greatly aﬀ ect the development 
of East Siberia’s resources. Th e government believes that the monumental task of revitalizing the region and 
forging energy ties with Asia can be entrusted only to loyal companies. Th erefore, Moscow is creating condi-
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tions for displacing private actors in this territory with state-owned corporations and for limiting the role of 
global majors. Figure 1 overleaf shows these changes in graphic form.
Figure 1. Key Eastern Players, 2000 – 2007
Gazprom
Russia’s natural gas monopoly is quickly founding its eastern empire. In 2005 it acquired Sibneft, which owns 
licenses on Sakhalin, Chukotka and in the Bering Sea. Its new subsidiary has 50 percent of Slavneft, which 
holds licenses in Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Gazprom hopes to acquire the other half of Slavneft, which currently 
belongs to TNK-BP. 
Gazprom made an important step forward by joining Sakhalin-2 as a majority shareholder, and thus enter-
ing the LNG market. During the course of 2006 the authorities threatened to shut Sakhalin Energy, the com-
pany running Sakhalin-2, because of alleged environmental violations. Th ose problems ended in December 
2006 when Gazprom acquired 50 percent + 1 share in the company.
In 2007, Gazprom ﬁ nally gained control over Kovykta. Under pressure from Gazprom and the state author-
ities, who complained about license violations, TNK-BP agreed to sell its share of RUSIA Petroleum, which 
held the rights to develop Kovykta. (Now it seems that Gazprom would like to acquire a stake in TNK-BP 
itself, rather than simply take over this project.)
With its purchase, Gazprom started preparing a new plan for developing Kovykta. Th is plan assumes that 
commercial production will begin in 2017 and the gas produced will be sold domestically to cover the poten-
tial shortage of blue fuel in Russia, though a certain proportion will likely go to China. Presumably, Gazprom 
is not interested in commissioning Kovykta more quickly since the project could divert funds from higher pri-
ority plans to develop ﬁ elds on the Yamal Peninsula.
 Gazprom’s success in putting the ﬁ eld on stream will hinge primarily on the results of negotiations with 
China, the leading potential foreign market for Kovykta gas. Th ese talks are now deadlocked because the two 
sides cannot agree on a price. Gazprom claims this failure was caused by the generous terms of the previous 
ExxonMobil-China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) agreement on Sakhalin-1 gas deliveries. 
Gazprom has further ambitions: it has announced plans to acquire the Chayandinsk ﬁ eld in Yakutiya, with 
1.24 tcm of gas reserves, and blocks of Sakhalin-3 uncontested. Making these acquisitions will require changes 
in Russian legislation.
Gazprom’s role in the east is unique since in 2002 the government appointed it coordinator of the state’s 
eastern gas policy and instructed it to develop the Eastern Gas Program. Th is work was completed only in 
2007 after numerous revisions. Even the latest version of the program contained 15 diﬀ erent scenarios for 
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developing eastern hydrocarbon ﬁ elds through 2030. Investments in the Eastern Gas Program to 2030 would 
be $60.1 billion, and gas production is envisaged at 27 bcm/yr by 2010, and at 162 bcm/yr by 2030.
Th e results of Gazprom’s initial ﬁ ve-year eﬀ ort leaves much to be desired. According to one government 
representative, the versions of the program were selected “under conditions of equal economic ineﬃ  ciency.” 
It would probably be too optimistic to expect that this document will help achieve a real breakthrough in gas 
industry development in East Siberia.
 In 2006, Gazprom further entrenched itself in the region by signing a protocol with CNPC on deliveries 
of up to 80 bcm of gas starting in 2011. Consequently, Gazprom is developing the Altai pipeline project, which 
is designed to pump to China 30 bcm/yr of gas from the Nadym-Pur-Taz region, whose reserves may be insuf-
ﬁ cient for this purpose. As a result, East Siberian gas might be needed to ﬁ ll the pipeline. 
Th rough its aggressive asset grabbing and the use of administrative resources, Gazprom turned from a vir-
tual player with high authority, but no actual assets, into a formidable force in the region. 
Th e key question is: Can Gazprom provide enough gas to meet its commitments to Europe, satisfy the 
growing domestic demand, and supply China?
Rosneft
Rosneft is Russia’s state-owned oil national champion. Having acquired the bulk of YUKOS’s oil assets, Ros-
neft was transformed from a minor player into the undisputed leader of the domestic oil industry. 
East Siberia and the Far East are the zone of Rosneft’s strategic interests. It has a strong presence in the 
Far East: its subsidiary Sakhalinmorneftegas is involved in the Sakhalin-1, -3, -4 and -5 projects. Sergei Bog-
danchikov, Rosneft’s CEO, originally headed Sakhalinmorneftegas, and this region is psychologically impor-
tant to him.
In addition to Sakhalin, Rosneft established a foothold in East Siberia. In 2003, it acquired Vankor in Kras-
noyarsk Krai, defeating Total and YUKOS, companies that both coveted the ﬁ eld. In 2005 Rosneft announced 
that Vankor’s recoverable reserves had increased to 250 mt through additional exploration. 
In addition to expanding its reserve base, Rosneft fought for Vankor because it could not cede this ﬁ eld to 
a foreign major. Vankor is important since it represents a potential new channel of oil export not controlled 
by the state. Vankor oil can be shipped along the Northern Sea Route, bypassing Transneft’s bottlenecks, and 
diversifying markets. Also, sending the oil north would avoid mixing the high-quality Vankor crude with the 
lower quality Urals blend.
However, after studying several transportation options, Rosneft decided to pump the Vankor crude to 
ESPO, because without Vankor it will be impossible to ﬁ ll the pipeline. Th us, the patronage of the Kremlin 
sometimes requires Rosneft to sacriﬁ ce proﬁ tability for political objectives. 
Filling the ESPO line has become an important priority for Rosneft. In 2005 the company further strength-
ened its eastern positions by buying 25.9 percent of Verkhnechonskneftegas, license holder for the Verkh-
nechonsk ﬁ eld. Rosneft needs this oil for ESPO, which after its rerouting passes near Verkhnechonsk. In 2007 
it acquired eastern assets of YUKOS, including in the Yurubcheno-Tokhomsk Zone in Evenkiya, also a poten-
tial supplier of ESPO. 
Rosneft’s downstream positions in the East are strong and expanding: initially, it owned the Komsomolsk 
reﬁ nery, two petroleum product distributors and three export terminals. Th en, Rosneft acquired all YUKOS 
reﬁ neries in 2007, including Angarsk and Achinsk in East Siberia, and its eastern fuel stations. Also, Rosneft 
intends to build a 20 mt/yr reﬁ nery at the end point of ESPO by 2012 – in line with Russia’s intentions of shift-
ing from exports of crude to higher value-added products. 
Geopolitically, Rosneft now plays an important role in Russia’s relations with China, South Korea and India. 
Rosneft opened the door to Russian oil for the Chinese - in 2005, Rosneft invited Sinopec, with a 25.5 percent 
share, to conduct and co-ﬁ nance exploration of the Sakhalin-3 Veninsky block. Th en, in mid-2006, Vostok 
Energy JV was established between Rosneft (51%) and CNPC (49%) to work in Russia’s upstream market, 
and in 2007, it won an auction for two ﬁ elds in the Irkutsk Region, close to the ESPO route. Another Russian-
Chinese JV in China will deal with reﬁ ning and marketing. 
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Rosneft has a special relationship with China, as the Chinese banks provided $6 billion for Rosneft’s Yugansk-
neftegas acquisition. Chinese oil companies aspired to player status in Russia for many years, but their achieve-
ments were practically nil before the Yugansk deal, which changed their fortunes. 
Th e Chinese further strengthened ties with Rosneft by becoming its shareholders. Th eir successes may be 
attributed to the socialist legacy of both countries, which makes it easier for the Chinese to understand the 
speciﬁ cs of doing business in Russia. Also, the Chinese not only try to access Russia’s upstream, but let Ros-
neft work in their downstream market as well.
South Korea is another country with which Rosneft does business by allowing the Korea National Oil Com-
pany (KNOC) to participate in the West Kamchatka shelf exploration on a 60% : 40% basis. 
India, through its state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC), is also an important Rosneft part-
ner. Th eir cooperation started in 2001 on Sakhalin-1. Th en, in 2007, Rosneft and ONGC signed a memoran-
dum, under which the Indians would access Russian oﬀ shore ﬁ elds, in return, paying for their development 
and admitting Rosneft to the Indian downstream market. 
Gazprom and Rosneft: Bitter Friends
In the past, Rosneft was too weak to compete with the almighty Gazprom. Recently, however, it has emerged 
as its rival on a variety of fronts – and is winning in many instances. 
Th is rivalry will probably intensify in the East. First, there might be further disputes about exports of Sakh-
alin-1 gas. Despite the credibility provided to Sakhalin-1 by Rosneft’s involvement, the project faces serious 
obstacles created by Gazprom’s desire to control its gas exports. Th erefore, when in 2006, Exxon Neftegas signed 
an agreement with CNPC to build a 8 bcm/yr pipeline to China, Gazprom strongly resisted the plan. 
In 2007, Gazprom demanded that Sakhalin-1 gas should be used to gasify eastern regions and not exported, 
though this PSA project can export gas independently of Gazprom. Gazprom’s demand is not dictated by its 
concern for the Russian regions, but its desire to eliminate competition with ExxonMobil, since an agreement 
with the Sakhalin-1 shareholders permits the Chinese to lower prices in negotiations with the concern.
Rivalry between Gazprom and Rosneft aggravates instability in the domestic oil and gas industry (and hin-
ders development of Russia’s East). Nevertheless, the two competitors ensure a de facto system of checks and 
balances.
Since Gazprom and Rosneft have radically strengthened their positions in Russia’s East, it has become a 
testing ground for the new state petroleum policy. “Russiﬁ cation” and “etatization” of the domestic oil and gas 
sector will probably continue. Global majors will be delegated the role of junior partners: thus, Rosneft per-
mitted BP to join Sakhalin-4 and Sakhalin-5 with 49 percent. Up to now Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2, both 
managed by foreigners, were the only eastern projects that showed real progress; and global majors remain the 
essential providers of technology and know-how. 
Private companies will be further displaced by Gazprom and Rosneft, probably not to the beneﬁ t of Rus-
sia’s East. Gazprom has its own corporate agenda that may diﬀ er from the national interests and hinders 
the development of some eastern regions. Rosneft might be spread too thin after its recent acquisitions to 
undertake major projects. Also, the state commissions them to perform additional social and political func-
tions, which might further undermine their eﬃ  ciency.
***
In sum, the development of Russia’s East and eﬀ orts to work in the Asian energy markets face formidable chal-
lenges. Major breakthroughs in creating an eastern hydrocarbon province appear unlikely in the immediate 
future. Most likely, sporadic progress will be achieved in easier-to-implement projects where national objec-
tives coincide with the corporate interests of Gazprom and Rosneft. 
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Regional Inﬂ uence in Oil and Gas Development: A Case Study of 
Sakhalin 
By Elana Wilson Rowe, Oslo
Abstract
Th e oﬀ shore oil and gas reserves oﬀ  Sakhalin Island in Russia’s Far East are one of Russia’s more 
promising locations for new ﬁ eld development and by 2010 Sakhalin’s oil production is expected to 
account for 7 percent of the demand in the Asia-Paciﬁ c region. Not surprisingly, Sakhalin regional 
authorities seek to ensure a level of regional control over oﬀ shore oil and gas development, along with 
the corresponding economic beneﬁ ts, despite a relatively weak position in light of Moscow’s eﬀ orts to 
centralize authority. Th is article examines ways in which regional administrations can and do inﬂ u-
ence the process of oﬀ shore oil and gas development in the Russian federation through a case study 
of the Sakhalin Oblast Administration. Regional authorities on Sakhalin have managed to retain 
an inﬂ uential role for themselves via: (1) encouraging onshore infrastructure for oﬀ shore oil and gas 
operations; (2) working to smooth the way for development at the federal level; (3) insisting on local 
content and contracts when possible; and (4) ﬁ nding opportunities for regional and local beneﬁ t via 
impact assessment processes. Th is analysis is based on a review of publicly available primary sources 
(e.g. company documents) and interviews carried out with regional authorities and foreign executives 
in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in September 2006.
Changing the Federal-Regional Relationship
Th e early days of the post-Soviet period were marked by a pronounced decentralization, with many formerly 
centrally-held competencies being delegated to regional governments. Technically, subsoil development was 
considered a shared federal-regional competency, with the federal government leading new initiatives and the 
regional government enjoying more involvement in proposal approval and implementation. However, most 
regional governments took a more pro-active role by establishing their own oil and gas concerns and taking an 
active and inﬂ uential interest in negotiating licenses and monitoring projects. 
Upon taking power at the end of 1999, President Vladimir Putin reversed the decentralization trend and 
replaced it with a policy to recentralize power and revenue. In August 2004, the State Duma passed a revised 
law on subsoil resources that eﬀ ectively returned their management to the federal government exclusively. Th e 
recentralization of power helped the federal government gain greater control over regional revenues, including 
proﬁ ts from oil and gas development. While the regions used to retain 50 percent of tax revenues, this balance 
has shifted in favor of Moscow, which then is to allocate revenues back to regional budgets. As becomes clear 
with the case of Sakhalin, much of the activity of the regional authorities is directed towards locating ways in 
which the revenues of oil and gas development can, despite recentralization, be captured at the regional level.
Regional Interventions and the Ambiguities of Russian Federalism
Historically, Sakhalin Oblast authorities did not gain as much control as other resource-rich regions during 
the post-Soviet decentralization, as oﬀ shore oil and gas ﬁ elds fell clearly under federal jurisdiction. Regard-
less, regional authorities have been largely supportive of development and can continue to be characterized as 
pro-development. In fact, it was primarily regional voices (although still only a few) that publicly supported 
the companies of the Sakhalin-2 consortium when the consortium announced cost overruns that could delay 
the stage at which the Russian federal government would gain substantial revenue from the project as outlined 
in the relevant production sharing agreement (PSA). Th e cost overrun, in tandem with record-high oil prices, 
a general push for greater federal control of energy projects and dissatisfaction with PSAs, resulted in enough 
regulatory and political pressure being placed on the consortium to ensure that Gazprom became the control-
ling shareholder. At a point where the tenor of the debate within Russia had become rather apocalyptic, Ev geny 
Galichanin, a member of the State Duma from Sakhalin and chairman of the Duma subcommittee on the oil 
industry stated, calmingly: “Th e situation must not be exaggerated and there must be no panic… Sensational 
statements and threats to withdraw the license are unacceptable.”
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Representing Sakhalin oil and gas interests at the federal level is perhaps the most important (and only) role 
that regional authorities have to play for projects in early licensing or exploration phases (such as the Sakhalin-3, 
4, 5 and 6 projects). Th e regional government had, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, been pro-active at 
the federal level in working to speed such nascent projects along, lobbying authorities in Moscow for improve-
ments and clariﬁ cations to PSA legislation. Although it is now clear that Russia will not sign any further PSAs 
due to dissatisfaction with the existing PSAs concluded in a period of economic turmoil in Russia and low 
world oil prices, regional authorities continue to work in Moscow to facilitate further development. As one oil 
executive put it in an interview with the author, “the regional government is our primary cheerleader because 
of the jobs and revenues that are evident at the local level.” Th is interviewee argued that regional authorities 
often work at the federal level to expedite Sakhalin-related issues. More room, however, for regional inﬂ uence 
opens up within advanced projects and a brief review of aspects of the Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects illus-
trates ways in which this inﬂ uence is acquired and wielded.
Sakhalin-1
Sakhalin-1 consists of Exxon (30%); Japan Sakhalin Oil (30%); India’s ONGC (20%); SakhalinMorneftegaz 
(11.5%) and RN-Astra (8.5%). A Sakhalin-1 PSA became eﬀ ective in 1996, but the project developed slowly 
until 2002. By 2006, Sakhalin-1 was one of the ﬁ ve biggest oil projects worldwide. 
Sakhalin’s regional leadership was reportedly unhappy with the Sakhalin-1 consortium’s early decision to 
use primarily sea transport, as its aim had been to involve both Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 in order to spread 
the risk and investment needed to build an oil and gas pipeline along the length of the island. Exxon, the oper-
ating company for Sakhalin-1, balked at the cost of the pipeline. Some critical approvals were then delayed until 
the Kremlin’s recentralization process greatly diminished regional authority and Exxon was able to pursue its 
preferred plans despite dissatisfaction at the regional level. Even though the regional authorities failed to realize 
their objective, this moment illustrates the overall desire of the regional government to bring oﬀ shore projects 
more “onshore” as soon as possible. Once projects are reliant on onshore infrastructure, there are more oppor-
tunities for local and regional inﬂ uence. While the Sakhalin Oblast administration and constituent municipal 
governments do not exercise control over the continental shelf, they do have signiﬁ cant authority over impor-
tant onshore elements, such as land and rights of way for onshore construction. 
One such example of onshore activity is an airport construction project in the northern town of Nogliki. 
Extensive upgrades of this local airport were carried out by Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 consortia working in 
tandem and the airport opened with regional approval for public and company use in 2004. Th is airport is also 
an example of how ambiguity and uncertainty in the division of competencies between the federal and regional 
levels can play an unpredictable role in the process of development – the airport was closed by federal author-
ities for general use in 2005 due to an alleged lack of necessary federal permits. Reportedly, an important ele-
ment for re-opening the airport to the public was a letter written by the president of Rosneft directly to Putin, 
who then ordered that the Nogliki Airport should be opened to commercial travel by June 2007.
Sakhalin-2
Sakhalin-2 – the largest integrated oil and gas project in the world – is run by a consortium of corporations 
collectively called the Sakhalin Energy Investment Company (SEIC). Royal Dutch Shell was the majority 
partner until Gazprom gained a controlling share of the project as the result of a December 2006 deal. Th e 
Sakhalin-2 project illustrates: 1) ways in which regional authorities wield inﬂ uence when new infrastructure 
or impact assessments are needed and 2) how the federal-regional ﬁ scal relationship motivates the pursuit of 
such indirect power. 
In terms of infrastructure and assessment, the ﬁ rst phase of the project involved the installation of an oﬀ -
shore platform with no onshore construction beyond staﬀ  housing and oﬃ  ce space. With the commencement of 
phase two in 2003, the inﬂ uence of the regional and municipal administrations increased as Sakhalin-2 needed 
to move its primarily oﬀ shore activities onshore. Phase two construction included a pipeline extending more 
than 600 kilometers down the length of the island to a newly constructed LNG (liqueﬁ ed natural gas) plant and 
oil export facility at the southern end of Sakhalin. Phase two, according to a 2005 company document outlin-
ing public consultation plans, resulted in $300 million in infrastructure development on Sakhalin, including 
the construction of new bridges, upgrading of public roads and improvements to docks and railways. 
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Th e expansion of onshore infrastructure opens another window for regional inﬂ uence via the municipal 
level. In 2001, Putin proposed devolving more authority to the municipal level, partly as a counterweight for 
recentralization. Th is proposition resulted in a 2003 law “On Local Self-Government” outlining reforms that 
thus far remain largely unimplemented. Th e reform itself does not devolve speciﬁ c authority relating to subsur-
face resource development and it is notable that regional governors and administrations, rather than munici-
pal representatives, were involved in the commission that developed the law. However, the clariﬁ cation of the 
land boundaries of municipalities may strengthen a card the municipal level already has to play – authority 
over land. As it stands now, oil and gas companies are frequently required to negotiate with municipal author-
ities when construction, such as a new pipeline, crosses municipal boundaries. Given the relatively low capac-
ity of many municipal governments, it is likely that the regional administration intervenes in this supposedly 
municipal process and works to extract maximum beneﬁ t, including additional desirable infrastructure and 
lease payments, from the relevant companies.
Phase two of the project also necessitated new rounds of consultation with local, regional and national 
stakeholders and environmental and social impact assessments. Th e impact assessment process is one in which 
regional law can be brought to bear in some ways. On the federal level, the SEIC impact assessment process 
was subject to 22 federal laws, 13 regulations and procedures and 8 guidance documents. On the regional 
level, 11 regional laws ranging from town planning to endangered species to taxation and 10 gubernatorial 
decrees had to be taken into consideration as well. It is noteworthy, however, that a 2003 SEIC text outlin-
ing the company’s approach to environmental impact assessment states clearly that the assessment is in keep-
ing with federal law and considers regional law. Obviously, regional law remains of secondary legal importance 
in the assessment process.
Th e question of federal-regional revenue sharing and the dramatic changes introduced in this ﬁ eld during 
the Putin presidency does much to explain why the regional level seeks to exert inﬂ uence and capture proﬁ t 
in the rather indirect ways described above. Th e Sakhalin-2 PSA illustrates this change vividly. Once Sakha-
lin Energy recovers the cost of its initial investment it will begin sharing proﬁ ts on a greater scale, as speciﬁ ed 
in its PSA, with the “Russian party.” When the Sakhalin-2 PSA was ﬁ rst set up, there was no clear line made 
between the federal and regional components of the “Russian party.” Subsidiary agreements clariﬁ ed that 
the oblast would receive 60 percent of proﬁ ts and the federal government 40 percent. Th e actual proﬁ t split 
between the regional and federal administrations, however, remains contingent on presidential decree and can 
be lawfully changed yearly or counteracted by new decrees. At present, and reﬂ ecting Putin’s recentralization 
of authorities and revenues, the regional administration now receives 5 percent of those revenues already gen-
erated today with 95 percent going to Moscow.
Th e contingency of regional proﬁ ts on federal decisions creates problems for the Sakhalin Administration, 
as it cannot achieve the level of revenue certainty required to secure long-term loans independently for infra-
structure development. One interviewee from within the oil sector with a long-term involvement on Sakhalin 
described this uncertainty as motivating the municipal and regional levels to look for large-scale and concrete 
beneﬁ ts, such as school and hospital infrastructure, from oil companies in exchange for granting approvals and 
leases on land use. Th e administration also seeks other opportunities for regional economic development and 
beneﬁ t. For example, the Sakhalin-2 consortium paid $100 million into the Sakhalin Development Fund in the 
ﬁ ve years following the commencement of commercial oil extraction. Th e oblast administration has also taken 
a keen interest in following how contracts are awarded and has promoted a “Sakhalin First” policy in relation 
to the award of tenders whenever this has been feasible, despite a lack of industrial capacity in the Russian Far 
East and the problem this poses to companies seeking to meet such local content requirements. 
Conclusions
Despite political and ﬁ scal centralization, Sakhalin authorities continue to exert indirect, albeit greatly reduced, 
inﬂ uence over the process of oil and gas development. Regional authorities have endeavored to expedite project 
development to the point where onshore infrastructure is both necessary and desirable. When oﬀ shore devel-
opment requires onshore access, oil and gas exploitation becomes more directly proﬁ table to, and controlla-
ble by, the region itself and the opportunities for capturing economic beneﬁ ts at the regional level increase. 
Th is facilitating and expediting role is exempliﬁ ed by regional authorities using their contacts in Moscow to 
intervene at the federal level on behalf of oil and gas consortiums active in Sakhalin and lobbying for expe-
dited award of PSAs and stable PSA legislation, when these agreements still seemed like a feasible alternative 
for moving development forward. 
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However, local authorities have not refrained from intervening and sometimes slowing projects’ development 
in order to increase regional involvement/control and potential regional beneﬁ ts. For example, Sakhalin Oblast 
has lobbied for local awards of contracts whenever possible, forwarding a “Sakhalin-ﬁ rst” policy, and success-
fully ensured that payments to the Sakhalin Development Fund were included in Sakhalin-1 and -2’s PSAs. 
Th is points to ways in which regional authorities are vigilant in holding oil and gas consortiums to the require-
ments of their contracts, particularly when these requirements result in direct beneﬁ t at the local and regional 
levels. Regional authorities also seem to be able to exercise some authority over the impact assessment process 
– an undertaking that certainly requires their knowledge of the local political and social environment.
Although the authority of the region is doubtlessly diminished, the ability of regional administrations to 
act as “cheerleaders” or “brakes” should not be underestimated. Th us it seems that although regional govern-
ments no longer possess the authority they once had, the complex and detailed processes entailed in oil and gas 
development necessitate good relationships on all levels of government. Th e regional level, in this way, retains 
residual power and also actively works to build up both formal and informal authority in new capacities.
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Part III: Energy and Foreign Policy

Russian Energy Power Abroad
By Jeronim Perovic, Zurich 
Abstract
Energy lies at the heart of Russia’s economic recovery. Th e wealth generated from energy exports has 
gone hand in hand with political stabilization and has contributed signiﬁ cantly to Russia’s assertive-
ness in international politics. Energy has emerged as a key factor shaping Russian’s foreign relations. 
But it is diﬃ  cult for Russia to use energy as leverage in a market where buyers, sellers, and interme-
diaries are so inter-connected. Th e interdependencies in the energy market are complex, and changes 
in the system can easily lead to conﬂ icts that might ultimately also aﬀ ect Russia in a negative way. 
Russia thus has to maneuver carefully in its decision-making, since the stability of the system also 
depends on the choices that the EU, Russia’s neighbors, and the US make. 
Russia’s Role for Eurasian Energy Flows
As a major supplier of fossil fuel, Russia plays an important role for global energy security. According to the 
most recent European Commission ﬁ gures, 27 percent of the oil and 24 percent of the gas consumed in the EU 
are of Russian origin. Of EU imports, 30 percent of its oil and 44 percent of its gas come from Russia. Some of 
Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors (e.g., Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova) as well as other non-
EU states (especially the western Balkan countries and Turkey) are likewise dependent on Russian energy. 
Russia also represents the most important channel for Eurasian energy ﬂ ows. Th e country is the main export 
outlet for Central Asian gas and oil and the most important consumer of gas from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
and Turkmenistan. Recent developments have only had a small impact on this picture. Some of the Caspian 
oil and gas exports sent westwards now circumvent Russian territory via newly constructed pipelines from 
Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey. Small amounts of Turkmen gas ﬂ ow to Iran by pipeline, and some of 
Kazakhstan’s oil is shipped to China via a new pipeline. 
Furthermore, Russia is seeking to become a key player on the Asian oil and gas markets. While the Sakh-
alin ﬁ elds already provide some energy to countries in the Asian-Paciﬁ c region, plans are underway to explore 
and develop East Siberian oil and gas ﬁ elds and to build a network of oil and gas pipelines connecting this 
region to Asian consumers. 
Concerns about Russia 
Russia has received bad press for its foreign energy policy. Th e price dispute between Gazprom and Ukraine, 
for instance, which ultimately prompted Russia to cut oﬀ  gas deliveries to Ukraine in January 2006, has some-
times been portrayed in Western media as a politically-motivated action and “punishment” from the Kremlin 
for the country’s “Orange Revolution” of 2004. Th e construction of a pipeline from Russia to Germany under 
the Baltic Sea and the penetration of the European energy market by Gazprom and other Russian energy com-
panies are often seen as part of a “divide and conquer” policy aimed at undermining eﬀ orts by European Union 
members to pursue a common European energy policy. Russia’s declared goal of entering the Asian energy mar-
ket is frequently depicted as an attempt to play oﬀ  East against West.
Russians argue that their actions are driven purely by business interests as they seek to secure the high-
est possible return for their energy sales. While Russian motivations remain a matter of contention, many are 
beginning to fear that Russia is simply not investing enough in its production capacity to provide suﬃ  cient 
oil and gas to meet growing European demand while satisfying new Asian customers. Russia’s ability to meet 
future world demand is becoming a question of increasing anxiety. Russian companies have been increasing 
their investment in upstream projects recently, but the question ultimately remains whether new ﬁ elds will 
come online before existing production falls to a point where Russia will not be able to meet the projected out-
put increase (see also Indra Øverland’s article on p. 45).
Nevertheless, Russia certainly has every interest in keeping a strong proﬁ le as an energy supplier to inter-
national markets. Th e energy sector is the motor of Russia’s economic growth and the massive rents generated 
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from oil and gas sales are highly important for Russia’s state revenues. In 2006, the Russian budget received 
close to $50 billion from oil export duties. Almost half of Russia’s total export earnings are oil-related.
Russian-European Energy Relations
Europe is by far Russia’s most important trading partner. Given the very strong mutual dependencies between 
Russia and Europe, it is at present hard to imagine that either side would see a beneﬁ t in applying sanctions 
against the other. Around two thirds of Russian gas and oil exports go to EU member states, while the rest is 
sold to other European countries and the CIS. According to European Commission ﬁ gures, in 2005, the EU 
accounted for some 56 percent of Russia’s exports and around 45 percent of its imports. In such numerical terms, 
the signiﬁ cance of Russia for Europe is relatively small. Russia is certainly important as a supplier of oil and gas 
to Europe, but its role is also conﬁ ned to these two commodities. Overall, in 2005, the country accounted for 
only about 10 percent of EU overall imports and consumed a little more than 6 percent of EU exports. 
Although in terms of overall trade volumes, Russia is clearly much more dependent on Europe than vice 
versa, it is the quality of the dependency that makes Russia equally important to Europe. Oil and gas are com-
modities of the highest strategic importance, and Europe at present cannot do without Russian supplies. A 
hypothetical stop of Russian oil deliveries would hurt Europe less than a disruption of gas supplies, however, 
simply because all of the gas that Europe imports from Russia arrives through pipelines and there are cur-
rently no alternative sources. Th e physical connection between consumers and producers is less immediate in 
the case of oil, where most imports arrive by tanker, and where shortfalls could theoretically be balanced via 
imports from other places. 
Europe could gain leverage in dealing with Russia if the members of the EU decided to speak with one 
voice towards Russia. As long as European countries prefer to deal with Russia on the basis of individual bilat-
eral relations, the EU cannot bring the full potential of its leverage to bear. Th is is why the EU has so far failed 
to achieve reciprocity in its energy relations. While Russian companies are allowed to enter the EU down-
stream market, EU and foreign companies still face obstacles when seeking similar access in Russia. Th e state-
controlled Gazprom monopoly controls 85 percent of gas production and all major gas pipelines and the state 
monopoly Transneft operates Russia’s oil transportation system. 
Th e EU has made a series of eﬀ orts to increase the pressure on Russia, for instance by a EU Commission 
proposal in summer 2007 that aims to break up big utilities that control power supply, generation, and trans-
mission. While this planned legislation is directed at some of Europe’s own big energy utilities, it would also 
eﬀ ectively bar foreign companies such as Gazprom from controlling European networks unless they play by 
the same rules as EU companies and their home country has an agreement with Brussels. While this plan faces 
opposition from within the EU itself, Russia has also reacted angrily, and it is still very uncertain whether this 
plan will be implemented in the near future. For the time being, however, the disputes in European-Russian 
relations are not reﬂ ected at the general level of business cooperation or in day-to-day politics. 
Energy Dependencies between Russia and its Post-Soviet Neighbors
Energy is also a major element in Russia’s relations with its post-Soviet neighbors. Russia is important for the 
region in two ways: as a customer and transit country for Central Asian gas and oil, and as a supplier of oil, gas, 
and electricity to energy-poor countries like Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus. 
But Russia is also dependent on some of these states. Russia relies on Central Asian gas imports in order 
to oﬀ set declining production from its own major ﬁ elds in Western Siberia. Ukraine and Belarus are impor-
tant as transit countries for Russian gas and oil to Europe: About 80 percent of Russia’s gas destined for 
Europe transits Ukraine. Russia’s biggest oil pipeline, Druzhba, which accounts for about one third of Rus-
sia’s crude exports to Europe, crosses Belarus. Even after the new oil and gas pipelines circumventing Ukraine 
and Belarus become operational, the bulk of Russian gas, and a signiﬁ cant share of Russian pipeline oil, will 
still pass through these two countries.
Th ere have been two notable changes in Russia’s approach towards its former Soviet neighbors in recent years: 
A ﬁ rst change is that Russia has stopped its policy of subsidizing other economies with cheap gas. Th us, from 
about 2005–2006 onwards, it started to raise prices to world market levels. It has occasionally done so in very 
bad style by abruptly shutting down energy supplies. But, even if Russia’s price hikes should cause more fric-
tion in the years to come, this development would still be a healthy one, as it would end the subsidies to these 
economies of cheap Russian energy and would eventually help to stabilize relations between Russia and its 
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neighbors based on market principles. In fact, Russia has been raising prices for its adversaries (e.g., Georgia) 
and allies (e.g., Belarus) alike, although at varying speeds. In some instances, Russia has even accepted that the 
price increase will result in a loss of inﬂ uence. For example, Georgia, which until recently imported all of its 
gas from Russia, is increasingly turning to Azerbaijan and Iran as alternative sources for its imports. Azerbai-
jan has stopped importing Russian gas altogether and has tapped into its own domestic sources. 
A second change has occurred in the way Russia handles the Central Asian gas producers. Russia is still the 
major outlet for the gas (and oil) extracted in the region, but given the competition from the EU, the US, and 
China for Central Asian energy, Russia has decided to become a more attractive customer by oﬀ ering higher 
prices. While Turkmenistan sold its gas to Russia for $44 per thousand cubic meters of gas in 2005 (with 
only half of it paid in cash), the price was $100 in 2007. In the meantime, the two sides have agreed to raise 
the price to $150 by July–December 2008. Russia is also paying much higher prices for gas purchased from 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
In addition to price increases, Russia has also oﬀ ered the Caspian states the opportunity to expand their 
direct outlets to the lucrative Western European market by using its transportation system. In December 2007, 
for example, Russia ﬁ nally agreed to expand the capacity of the pipeline operated by the Caspian Pipeline Con-
sortium, which transports mainly Kazakhstan’s oil westwards. Moscow decided to expand the capacity after 
Kazakhstan consented to ship oil through the planned Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline, a trans-Balkan pipe-
line designed to take Russian and Central Asian oil from Bulgaria to Greece. 
In the case of Caspian gas, Europe is now competing with China for supplies. Currently, Russia buys up Cen-
tral Asian gas and uses it to supply its own domestic market and the markets of Ukraine and other CIS states, 
thus freeing Russian gas for export to Europe at a higher price than Russia paid for it in Central Asia. Should 
China manage to divert substantial parts of Central Asia’s gas eastwards, however, the balance between the CIS 
and Russia will suﬀ er, thus potentially leaving less gas for Europe. While both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
have already concluded agreements with China on gas supply via new pipelines, Kazakhstan is also contem-
plating the construction of a gas pipeline eastward along the route of the existing oil pipeline. 
Russian-Asian Energy Relations
Th e concern that Russia might divert increasing volumes of already scarce energy to Asia, mostly to China, thus 
leaving less for Europe, is a distorted view insofar as it leaves a key element of Russia’s Asia strategy out of the 
picture: namely, that Russia intends to develop new ﬁ elds in East Siberia and the Far East for the purpose of 
making additional oil and gas available for the Asian market (see also Nina Poussenkova’s article on p. 50). 
However, Russia’s diversiﬁ cation eﬀ orts towards Asia are not going as smoothly as planned. Apart from the 
Sakhalin oil and gas projects, other major projects – like the Kovytka gas ﬁ eld in Eastern Siberia – are still in 
the early stage of development. If the ﬁ elds of Eastern Siberia are to be developed, the building of an extensive 
pipeline infrastructure to East Asia is of paramount importance. Th is, however, has also proved to be more 
complicated than anticipated. Negotiations with Japan and China have been going on since the early 1990s, 
but it is still uncertain when the pipelines will be built and become operational. Even the routes are still under 
discussion.
Th ere are multiple reasons for Russia’s failure to make much progress on the Asian energy front. In the 
area of gas, a major obstacle is certainly that Russia and China have not yet been able to agree on a price that 
will guarantee that Russia’s large planned up-front investments will pay oﬀ  within a foreseeable time span. Yet 
another, potentially more important issue is that Russia’s policy towards China still seems to suﬀ er from a psy-
chological blockade fueled by decades of mutual mistrust. Russia understands that it has to engage with China 
for economic reasons, but it feels uneasy providing the fuel for China’s modernization, which will inevitably 
accelerate the rise of a neighbor that could, from the Russian point of view, not only surpass Russia economi-
cally, but also pose a military threat in the future. 
Even if pipelines are constructed that tie Asia to the ﬁ elds in Western Siberia (a region that has tradition-
ally supplied the European market), the key issue would likely not be politics, but the price that Russia’s cus-
tomers in West and East are ready to pay. As of now, Europe remains by far the most lucrative market for Rus-
sian gas and oil, and the most important source for generating Russian export revenues. Under normal polit-
ical and economic circumstances, Russia is unlikely to redirect gas destined for its traditional costumers in 
Europe to Asia unless it can achieve similar or better conditions.
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Contrary to what is often written in the Western media, the main point for Russia is not to balance Europe 
against Asia, but to establish a diversity of customers among the individual Asian countries (mainly China and 
Japan) and, in the case of Sakhalin, among Asia and the US. Russia seeks a diversity to reduce its dependence 
on any particular customer.
Energy and Russia’s Future
Th e international markets are dependent on Russian energy, but Russia is also dependent on these markets. 
Th e real worry for Europe and Russia’s neighbors is not so much with regard to Russia’s foreign energy policy, 
but the role that energy plays for Russian domestic trajectories. 
Energy has provided the fuel for Russia’s economic growth and has helped to stabilize Russia after the 
political chaos and economic turmoil of the 1990s. But this stabilization has come at the expense of democ-
racy and uneven economic development in favor of the raw materials’ sector. Th e massive new wealth from oil 
and gas sales has also helped spur an increase in corruption and authoritarian tendencies. Russia’s stability is 
very much linked to the ability of the ruling elite to redistribute rents in a way so as to accommodate the vari-
ous conﬂ icting interests in Russian society. At least indirectly, Russia’s stability is thus tied to a well-function-
ing domestic and international energy market and stable prices. It also depends on Russia’s ability to continue 
playing a signiﬁ cant role as a supplier of energy to international markets. Major disruptions would ultimately 
test Russia’s precarious political stability. 
Th e challenge for Russia’s new president will be to manage Russia’s energy wealth in the way that is best 
for the country’s long-term political, economic, and social development. Such eﬀ orts can best succeed if Russia 
manages to develop a thriving liberal market that is at least to some extent dependent on an open society. 
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Gazprom’s Expansion Strategy in Europe and the Liberalization of EU 
Energy Markets
By Andreas Heinrich, Koszalin
Abstract
Gazprom has focused its expansion strategy on Europe, its main consumer market. Driven by a 
desire to open up and secure markets as well as to acquire strategic assets in these markets, the com-
pany has intensiﬁ ed its internationalization eﬀ orts in the last couple of years. Th e European Union 
(EU) gas market liberalization has also propelled Gazprom’s expansion; the company has striven to 
increase its share in the European downstream market. However, Gazprom’s expansion in Europe 
is running into increasing opposition fuelled by fears of over-reliance on Russian gas and growing 
Russian inﬂ uence on distribution networks in Europe.
Gazprom’s Expansion Strategy
Russia’s quasi-gas-monopoly Gazprom is trying to re-establish its networking and extraction-supply chain on 
the territory of the former Soviet Union and expand its traditional consumer markets in Western and Central 
Europe. To this end, it is venturing into new markets and market segments, such as power generation. Addi-
tionally, the company is expanding into new global markets in the Middle, Near, and Far East, South Amer-
ica, and Africa. 
Gazprom has developed plans to expand natural gas exports in all possible directions. Since 2005, its 
export share has sharply increased, from a formerly fairly stable level of around one-third of its production 
to nearly half of its overall production in 2006 (see Table 1 on p. 71). In Western and Central Europe espe-
cially, Gazprom is trying to diversify the structure of its consumer base and to increase its participation in 
deliveries to end-users. Gazprom has established overseas sale subsidiaries in nearly all countries to which 
its natural gas is exported. Moreover, the company has made overtures to gain direct access to large indus-
trial and gas-ﬁ red power generation markets in Western and Central Europe.
Th ese actions represent attempts at market-seeking (participation in the EU downstream market) as well as 
strategic asset- or capability-seeking – mainly in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union – in order to main-
tain inﬂ uence and secure control over transit routes. To prevent its partners from engaging in opportunistic behav-
ior, Gazprom is endeavoring to maintain control through majority ownership rather than acting as a mere proﬁ t-
seeking investor (see Table 2 on p. 71–73). Th e company certainly wanted to take the opportunity to enter the 
liberalized EU gas market.
EU Gas Market Liberalization as a Pull Factor
Th e ﬁ rst formal step in the liberalization process of the European gas market was the ﬁ rst EU Gas Directive 
(98/30/EC). Adopted in June 1998, the Directive laid down the common rules for an EU internal gas market 
in which eventually all users were to have a choice of supplier. It came into force in August 2000.
In June 2003, the European Commission (EC) issued the second Gas Directive (2003/55/EC), which stipu-
lated a new set of common rules for the internal gas market and thus replaced the ﬁ rst Directive. In so doing, the 
EC wanted to reduce the power of energy companies by obligating them to split up or “unbundle” the owner-
ship of generation and distribution networks. Th e Directive granted all non-household gas customers the right to 
choose their supplier freely as of 1 July 2004 at the latest, with all customers to have this right by 1 July 2007.
Gazprom has proﬁ ted from the EU’s gas market liberalization initiatives by gaining access to the down-
stream business in Europe. To participate in the proﬁ table downstream market, it has established joint ven-
ture marketing companies in nearly all of its consumer countries (see Table 2 on p. 71–73). Gazprom has also 
invested in non-core business equity outside the Russian Federation, like gas equipment manufacturing, pet-
rochemicals, media and ﬁ nancial services.
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Gazprom’s Joint Ventures in Europe
It is diﬃ  cult to establish a full picture of Gazprom’s activities abroad. Th e company puts enormous eﬀ ort into 
covering its tracks by using subsidiaries such as Gazprom Germania (Germany), Gazprombank (Russia), Gaz-
prom Media (Russia), or shell companies to invest overseas. One can only guess at the reasons: to avoid resis-
tance to its investment in the host countries and/or to avoid taxation and/or for asset stripping purposes. As of 
2005, the company’s strategy for the upcoming decade was not only to become a gas giant (which it already 
was), but “to become the largest energy company in the world” (Alexander Medvedev). Th erefore, the compa-
ny’s joint ventures listed in Table 2 on p. 71–73 only represent the tip of the iceberg.
Gazprom’s investment activities frequently encounter opposition. Th e problems and political protests Gaz-
prom met in its attempts to acquire the Hungarian Borsodchem in 2000 and the British Centrica in 2006 high-
light the fact that the Russian gas company is not always welcome in Europe. Gazprom used an Ireland-based 
sham ﬁ rm for a hostile take-over of Hungary’s Borsodchem chemical manufacturer in 2000, a move that was 
opposed by the Hungarian government and led to numerous political protests. Nevertheless, Gazprom was 
able to acquire a 25 percent stake in the company.
In 2006, Gazprom planned to acquire Centrica, which owns the largest distribution network in Great Brit-
ain. However, the British government signaled discontent and undertook measures to make the acquisition 
more complicated. As a result, Gazprom backed down from the deal but issued a sharp warning to Europe not 
to interfere in its eﬀ orts to expand on the continent, calling the practice discriminatory.
However, despite these backlashes, Gazprom has not abandoned its desire to diversify into Europe’s gas 
transportation, distribution and power generation industries to gain added value and build upon its traditional 
business of supplying wholesale gas supplies to regional monopolies. In its latest move, Gazprom is negotiating 
to acquire storage facilities and distribution hubs across the EU; the company is eager to have direct access to 
the distribution networks as well as venture into power generation. Th e new strategy involves establishing joint 
ventures to build large natural gas storage depots in Hungary, Germany, Belgium, Serbia, and Romania. Th e 
storage facilities are designed to cope with unusually high demand during cold snaps and would help to ensure 
continued supplies to Western markets in case of new disputes involving the pipeline transit countries.
Additionally, Soteg SA, a Luxemburg company, and Gazprom struck a deal in April 2007 to build an 800 
megawatt electricity-generating facility in Eisenhüttenstadt, Germany. Th e facility plans to sell most of its elec-
tricity across several EU states via long-term industry contracts.
More Liberalization, but with Safeguards
In September 2007, the EC published its “third liberalization package” of EU energy legislation focusing on 
anti-competitiveness within European energy markets. It presented EU governments with the option of full 
ownership unbundling or introducing an Independent System Operator (ISO) for the gas sectors. Originally, 
the EC wanted only to propose full ownership unbundling, but after signiﬁ cant pressure from Germany and 
France, the EC ended up oﬀ ering both options. (Germany and France argue that unbundling would weaken 
their bargaining position against energy suppliers like Russia.) Ownership unbundling would involve selling 
the transmission business or dividing the network operations from production and supply. Alternatively, the 
network could be run by an ISO approved by the EC. Th is would allow integrated energy companies to con-
tinue to own networks, but at the price of relinquishing day-to-day control of these networks to independent 
operators.
Th e EC legislation also bans any non-EU company from controlling European gas networks. Th e unbun-
dling proposals would also extend to gas storage providers, which also supply gas. In EU states choosing own-
ership unbundling, networks would be oﬀ  limits to any energy supplier regardless of nationality; in states opt-
ing for ISOs, any energy supplier could invest in, but not control or operate, an EU network.
If enacted, the EC legislative proposals would both seriously jeopardize Gazprom’s expansion plans and 
also undermine the position the company has already achieved in EU markets. Th e proposals would not only 
prevent Gazprom from buying parts of the EU’s transmission network, but would also force the company to 
sell its assets in EU transport, distribution, and storage infrastructures or spin them oﬀ  into separate compa-
nies managed by independent operators. Th is would undo the strategy that the company has been pursuing 
for the last few years, which is to dominate all segments of the EU gas market (production, transport, stor-
age, and distribution). However, Gazprom could still acquire generation, production, and retail assets.
Russia’s Energy Sector between Politics and Business 69
Russian politicians have criticized the EC’s liberalization proposals. Russian oﬃ  cials consider many of 
these to be unfair business practices and demand non-discriminatory access to downstream assets in Europe. 
In October 2007, Gazprom hinted that it was prepared to take retaliatory measures if the EU decided to limit 
its expansion.
Most experts believe that the EC’s draft is unlikely to come into force in its present form. Th e legislative ini-
tiative must be approved by the European Parliament and the Council, and may have to undergo major adjust-
ments. Th ere is already opposition to the legislation inside the EU; the proposal has already been criticized by 
German and French government oﬃ  cials and EU companies that are monopolies in their respective markets.
European Concerns about Over-Dependence on Russian Gas
EU countries are concerned about over-reliance on Russian gas. Th e EU is therefore aiming to open up energy 
markets to competition and secure energy supplies through the diversiﬁ cation of sources by geographical regions, 
goals which may adversely aﬀ ect Russian gas exports to the EU in the medium and long runs. Th is position 
has been explicitly formulated by the European Commission. Even though there are oﬃ  cially no restrictions 
on amounts, it is recommended that not more than 30 percent of EU members’ energy needs come from any 
one source. 
Th e Eastern European EU members are highly dependent on Russian gas (see Table 3 on p. 74). Th e West-
ern European states’ reliance on Russia is fairly low by comparison, especially when European domestic energy 
extraction is taken into account. Even Germany, by far the largest consumer of Russian gas in the EU, has 
managed to keep the Russian share in its overall gas consumption fairly stable at approximately one-third since 
the 1970s. 
Th e EU is also striving to further geographically diversify its energy supplies as an instrument of energy secu-
rity (for the current EU-27 supply structure, see Table 4 on p. 74). Th is is the purpose of a number of current 
projects, such as pipelines from North Africa, the Nabucco pipeline running from the eastern border of Turkey 
to Southern Europe, and the construction of further terminals for liqueﬁ ed natural gas (LNG). Th e Nabucco 
project, which has been delayed by internal problems, is countered by Russia’s South Stream pipeline project, 
which it announced in June 2007 and which would transport Russian gas to Italy and Austria. Th e 900-km 
South Stream pipeline is to cross the Black Sea directly into Bulgaria. From there, two onshore branches, one 
going to Austria and the other to Greece and then to Italy will be considered. Th e pipeline will have a capacity 
of 30 bcm per year and will take three years to build. Gazprom expects the work to start in 2008 or 2009.
Algeria is being eyed by EU oﬃ  cials as a primary source for the diversiﬁ cation of gas supplies in order 
to decrease dependence on Russian gas. Meanwhile, Gazprom is pursuing closer cooperation with the Alge-
rian government and local gas operators, reportedly in an attempt to establish an international cartel to con-
trol the majority of the European market’s gas supplies. Th e two sides plan to work together on production, 
extraction, and transportation of local gas to the world market. However, due to divergent interests between 
the potential partners (that would supposedly also include Iran, Qatar etc.) of this “gas OPEC,” its creation 
seems rather unlikely.
Taking into account the events of the Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis in January 2006, the question arises 
whether Gazprom is a reliable energy supplier. Although the natural gas aﬀ air damaged the Kremlin’s image, 
Gazprom’s actions – when regarded dispassionately – gave no reason to question the company’s reliability as 
a gas supplier. Th e very fact that the authorities were obliged to reverse their decision to cut oﬀ  gas supplies 
to Ukraine clearly shows that ﬁ ddling with the gas tap is not a real policy option for Russia. Th e Russian side 
cannot seriously blackmail either the transit states or the end customers in Europe, because it is fundamentally 
dependent on both. In 2006, around 54 percent of Gazprom’s natural gas exports were delivered to the EU-27, 
while a further 9.3 percent went to other European countries (including Turkey).
However, as the crisis over oil supplies with Belarus in January 2007 showed, Russia is a slow learner.
Nevertheless, Gazprom has proven to be a reliable supplier of natural gas to the EU. But even if Gazprom 
does not per se constitute a risk factor for the energy security of the EU and its members, they would never-
theless be well advised to continue their current diversiﬁ cation eﬀ orts, since technical diﬃ  culties, for instance, 
can never be excluded. An intensiﬁ cation of energy ties with Russia, such as Germany is pursuing with the 
Nord Stream gas pipeline project, is not advisable. Germany should not be tempted by this deal to signiﬁ cantly 
increase the share of Russian gas in its overall energy supply.
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However, EU concerns have so far failed to translate into a united energy policy towards Russia. Many EU 
members still favor national champions in the energy sector, whose strong position domestically and interna-
tionally is valued more than a common EU energy policy. Th ese companies seek to develop privileged relations 
with Gazprom. Each EU country has its own bilateral relationship and special deals with Russia over energy. 
Countries that enjoy close energy cooperation with Russia (like Germany and Italy) have a stronger inclina-
tion to engage with Gazprom than other EU members. Additionally, the range of Russian gas on EU mem-
bers’ energy balances diﬀ ers strongly (see Table 3 on p. 74).
Conclusion
Gazprom has focused its expansion strategy on Europe, its main consumer market. It has intensiﬁ ed its inter-
nationalization eﬀ orts since the EU introduced its gas market liberalization policy. Th e EU has put pressure 
on energy companies to dismantle the links between production, transportation, and distribution to open the 
sector to greater competition and price transparency; meanwhile, Gazprom’s strategy in Europe entails estab-
lishing a large distribution and trading network throughout the EU.
However, Gazprom’s expansion in Europe has not been smooth sailing. Fuelled by concerns of overdepen-
dence on Russian gas and of Russian control over distribution networks in Europe, member states are search-
ing for alternative supplies.
Even though Gazprom has had a reliable track record as a supplier, its western clients should continue their 
current diversiﬁ cation eﬀ orts. However, Gazprom is doing everything in its power to undermine these eﬀ orts: 
for example, the company is blocking the Nabucco pipeline project by supplying the markets with Russian gas 
via the South Stream pipeline. Gas hubs and storage facilities within the EU will be ﬁ lled with Russian gas 
and thus blunt demand for gas from other sources.
A common energy policy is needed to make diversiﬁ cation work. One way to increase the EU’s energy 
security would be to liberalize its own market and unbundle its national utilities. Th is would cut proﬁ t mar-
gins in gas distribution, and thereby reduce Gazprom’s appetite for these assets. It would also weaken “special 
relationships” between Russia and single member states and thus strengthen a common EU energy policy. Th e 
weakened bargaining position of individual EU energy companies against energy suppliers would be oﬀ set by 
a common EU position presented by the EU energy commissioner. 
Europe is also talking of building more LNG terminals that can be supplied by other suppliers; unlike the 
pipeline projects, these facilities would be beyond the reach of the Russian gas behemoth. 
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Gazprom Joint Ventures, EU Gas Imports
Table 1: Share of Exports in Gazprom’s Total Natural Gas Production (in bn cm)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Production 533.8 553.7 545.6 523.2 511.9 521.9 540.2 545.1 555.0 556.0
Exports 188.9 173.0 174.0 173.7 166.5 168.9 175.5 192.0 232.7 262.5
Export ratio 35.4 31.2 31.8 33.2 32.5 32.4 32.5 35.2 41.9 47.2
Sources: Company information; own calculations. 
Table 2: Gazprom’s Joint Ventures in Europe in 2006 (including oﬀ shore locations)
Country Joint venture Share Activities
Austria ARosgas Holding AG 100 Gas marketing
Gas- und Warenhandelsgesellschaft 
(GHW)
50 Gas trading
Sibneft Oil Trade GmbH 100 Oil trading
ZGG-Zarubezhgazneftechim Trading 
GmbH
100 Gas trading
ZMB Gasspeicher Holding GmbH 66.7 Gas storage
Bulgaria Topenergo 100 Gas trading and transport
Overgas 50 Gas trading
Overgas Inc. 50 N/A
Cayman Is-
lands
ZGG Cayman Holding Ltd. 100 Investment company
ZGG Cayman Ltd 100 Investment company
Cyprus Ecofran Marketing Consulting & Commu-
nication Services Company Ltd.
N/A N/A
GASEXCO Gas Exploration Company 
Ltd.
N/A Gas exploration
Greatham Overseas Limited N/A N/A
Leadville Investments Ltd. 100 Investment company
MF Media Finance (Overseas) Ltd. N/A Investment company
NTV World Ltd. N/A Media
Odex Exploration Ltd. 20 Oil exploration
Private Company Limited by Shares GPBI 
(Cyprus) Ltd.
N/A N/A
Siritia Ventures Ltd. N/A Investment company
Czech Re-
public
Gas Invest 37.5 Investment company
Vemex s.r.o. 33 Gas trading
Estonia Eesti Gaas 37.2 Gas trading and transport
Finland Gasum Oy 25 Gas transportation and marketing
North Transgas Oy 100 Pipeline construction beneath the Baltic Sea
France FRAgaz 50 Gas trading
Sofrasi 30 Representative oﬃ  ce
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Country Joint venture Share Activities
Germany Agrogaz GmbH 100 Via ZGG
Centrex Beteiligungs GmbH 38 Gas trading and investment company
НТВ Europa GmbH N/A Media
Gazprom Germania (formerly known as 
ZGG)
100 Gas trading
Verbundnetz Gas (VNG) 5.3 Gas transportation and marketing
Wingas 33a Gas transportation and storage
Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus (WIEH) 50 Gas trading
ZMB Mobil 100 Gas-fuelled automobile technology
ZMB-Zarubezhgaz Management und 
Beteiligungsgesellschaft GmbH (ZMB 
GmbH)
100 Gas trading
Gibraltar Bleakend Holdings Limited N/A Media
Greece Prometheus Gaz 50 Marketing and construction
Hungary Borsodchem 25 Petrochemicals
DKG-EAST Co. Inc. 38.1 Oil and gas equipment manufacturing
Gazkomplekt KFT N/A N/A
NTV Hungary Commercial Limited Li-
ability Company
N/A Media
Panrusgas 40 Gas trading and transport
Ireland GPB Finance Plc. N/A Investment company
Italy Promgaz 50 Gas trading and marketing
Volta 49 Gas trading and transport
Latvia Latvijas Gaze 34 Gas trading and transport
Lichtenstein IDF Anlagegesellschaft 50 Investment company (holding via Siritia 
Ventures Ltd., Cyprus)
Lithuania Kaunas power plant 99.5 Gas ﬁ red heat and power plant
Lietuvos Dujos 37.1 Gas trading and transport
Rizhskiy Farfor N/A N/A
Stella-Vitae 30 Gas trading
Poland Gas Trading 18.4 Gas trading
Evropol Gaz (Europolgaz) 48 Gas transport
Romania WIEE Romania SRL 50 Gas distribution
WIROM Gas S.A. 26 Gas trading (controlled through WIEH)
Serbia Progresgaz Trading Ltd. 25–50 Gas trading
YugoRosGaz 75 Gas trading and transport
Slovakia Slovrusgaz 50 Gas trading and transport
Slovenia Tagdem 7.6 Gas trading
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Country Joint venture Share Activities
Switzerland Baltic LNG 80 Development and sale of LNG
Gaz Project Development Central Asia AG 
(GPD)
50 Gas development and marketing
Nord Stream AG 51 Operator of the planned ‘Nord Stream’ 
pipeline
RosUkrEnergo AG 50 Gas trading
Sibur-Europe 100 Investment company
Wintershall Erdgas Handelshaus Zug AG 
(WIEE)
50 Gas trading
ZMB (Schweiz) AG 100 Gas trading
Th e Nether-
lands
Blue Stream Pipeline Co 50 Gas transportation and construction
Brochan B.V. N/A N/A
Gazinvest Finance B.V. N/A Investment company
Gazprom Finance B.V. 100 Investment company
Gazprom Netherlands B.V. 100 N/A
Gazprom Sakhalin Holdings B.V. 100 Owns 50% and 1 share in Sakhalin Energy, 
the operator of the Sakhalin-II oil and gas 
ﬁ eld
NTV-НТВ Holding and Finance B.V N/A Media
NTV Plus B.V. N/A Media
Pieter-Gaz 51 Gas trading
Sib Finance B.V. N/A Investment company
West East Pipeline Project Investment 100 Construction and investment company
Turkey Bosphorus Gaz 40 Gas trading
Turusgaz 45 Gas trading
UK / Belgium Interconnector 10 Pipeline which connected Bacton (UK) with 
Zeebrugge (Belgium)
UK Gazprom UK Ltd 100 Investment company
Gazprom UK Marketing and Trading Ltd. 100 Gas trading
HydroWingas 16.6a Gas trading
Sibur International 100 Petrochemicals
WINGAS Storage UK Ltd. 33 Underground gas storage reconstruction
Virgin Islands Benton Solutions Inc. N/A N/A
Media Financial Limited N/A Financial services
Nagelfar Trade & Invest Ltd. N/A N/A
NTV Media International Limited N/A Media
Sib Oil Trade 100 Oil trading
Note: a) In 2007, Gazprom increased its shareholding in the German Wingas to 49.9%. As a result, its holding in HydroWingas 
(UK) increased to 25%.
Sources: Gazprom company information;  Hans-Martin Tillack, “Die Gazoviki, das Geld und die Gier”, Stern, No. 38 
(2007): 192–198.
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Table 3: EU members’ dependence on gas supplies from Russia, 2006
Imports from Russia 
(in bcm)
Percentage of total gas imports
Bulgaria 2.7 100
Estonia 0.7 100
Finland 4.9 100
Slovakia 7.0 100
Latvia 1.4 100
Lithuania 2.8 100
Romania 5.5 87.3
Greece 2.7 84.4
Hungary 8.8 80.0
Czech Republic 7.4 77.9
Austria 6.6 75.9
Poland 7.7 72.6
Slovenia 0.7 63.6
UKa 8.7 41.2
Germany 34.4 37.9
Italy 22.1 28.6
Th e Netherlandsa 4.7 25.4
France 10.0 20.2
Belgium 3.2 14.1
Note: a) Th e Netherlands and the UK are still large gas producers on their own; their dependency level on Russian gas is therefore 
rather misleading.
Source: Gazprom Annual Report 2006. Moscow: Gazprom (2007), pp. 49-50; BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 
2007, p. 30; own calculations.
Table 4: EU-27 Natural Gas Supplies, 2006
Volume (in bcm) Percentage of the total supplies
EU-27 production 195.3 42.2
Russia 118.7 25.7
Algeria 54.6 11.8
Norway 46.6 10.1
Nigeria 13.5 2.9
Egypt 8.5 1.8
Libya 8.4 1.8
Others 17.0 3.7
Total 462.6 100
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007, pp. 24, 30.
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Will Russia Create a Gas Cartel?
By Matteo Fachinotti, Zurich
Abstract
Th e media has hyped the idea of a new gas OPEC which could menace the European Union with 
the specter of even higher prices for natural gas. Th is speculation has little to do with reality however. 
Numerous obstacles will prevent the formation of such a global cartel. Nevertheless, other types of 
producer alliances may be possible and these deserve careful attention. 
Rhetoric Currently Exceeds Reality 
“Europe, the U.S., and Asia should be doing everything possible to prepare for the possible future of a natu-
ral gas cartel. Gazprom is already actively engaged in anti-competitive policies to pre-empt, disaggregate, and 
coordinate the energy market.” Th is warning from Robert Amsterdam, a former legal counsel to Yukos, is an 
example of a recent trend in the Western media portraying the threat of a gas cartel led by Russia as the next 
step in Russia’s attempt to control energy ﬂ ows to Europe. Th is interpretation is exaggerated. 
To be sure, the rhetoric of the Russian leadership with regard to the possibility of a gas cartel has not helped 
to ease Europe’s fears. At the end of 2006, Vladimir Putin responded publicly to Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s proposal that a gas OPEC was “an interesting idea and we will think about it.” In January 2007, 
a deal between Algeria (the second largest supplier of natural gas to Europe) and Russia to boost energy coop-
eration seemed to conﬁ rm to the already suspicious Europeans that Russia was up to something that meant 
bad news. During his visit to Qatar in February 2007, Putin reiterated that “we do not reject the idea of creat-
ing a gas cartel.” Moreover, the Kremlin leader announced that Russia will send a high-level delegation to the 
Gas Exporting Countries’ Forum (GECF) meeting in Doha on April 9, 2007, where the issue of creating a gas 
cartel has been formally put on the agenda. 
All these developments feed into the Western view of an increasingly aggressive Russia trying to use energy 
as a weapon against Europe by creating a gas-OPEC. Th e reality, however, is more complex. Several senior 
Russian oﬃ  cials described the idea of a cartel as ludicrous. A Kremlin spokesman said there was “no substance 
at all” to this claim, and that Russia’s main approach to energy policy remained “interdependence of produc-
ers and consumers.” Minister of Energy Viktor Khristenko commented that there were no objective grounds 
to create a gas cartel. Indeed, the consensus among energy experts is that such a cartel is simply not feasible 
for a variety of reasons related to the structure of the gas market and the irreconcilable interests of some of the 
major players. Of course, from the point of view of Europe, the net result of these conﬂ icting signals is a big 
question mark about what the Russians are up to. In this context, the talks at the GECF meeting in Doha will 
be watched carefully. 
Obstacles to a Gas Cartel
Th e GECF was created in 2001 in Teheran and it has been described as a potential institutional framework 
that will slowly evolve into some kind of producers’ cartel. However, in its six years of existence, the GECF has 
not been able to produce any signiﬁ cant agenda. It has functioned essentially as an informal discussion plat-
form, and its organization has been frequently chaotic, as illustrated by the collapse of the Venezuelan presi-
dency in 2006. 
Th e heterogeneous membership of the organization has played a large role in the lack of clarity about the 
objectives and the functioning of the organization. It brings together LNG exporters focused on the Atlantic 
Basin (Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, and Egypt) and the Paciﬁ c Basin (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei), as well as 
large pipeline exporters such as Russia. Other major pipeline players, like Canada, are not part of the forum, 
while Norway only has observer status. Iran, one of its most active members, is not yet an exporter of any sig-
niﬁ cance, despite its future potential. 
Another important reason why experts doubt the success of a gas OPEC is related to the structure of the 
world gas market, which is actually not a single market like the one for oil, but a series of regional markets.
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Th ose who argue that establishing a cartel is indeed a possibility generally point to the high concentration 
of gas reserves in a small set of countries. Taken together, the top ﬁ ve countries by size of reserves (Russia, Iran, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) control 62 percent of the world’s total reserves. Additionally, the seven larg-
est exporters account for 80 percent of world gas trade, a very high level of concentration. But these ﬁ gures also 
mean that a cartel excluding one of these countries, such as Russia (which accounts for 30 percent of world 
exports), would not wield extensive market control. Th is fact is important since many analysts agree that at least 
in the medium-run, Russia’s interests diverge from those of other major exporters, particularly Qatar’s.
Russia historically has relied on long-term contracts to deliver gas via pipeline to European markets. Gaz-
prom has often indicated that long-term contracts are its preferred option in order to sustain the massive infra-
structure investments needed to bring Russian reserves to market. Russian policy-makers continue to stress the 
importance of security of demand and deem a continued reliance on pipelines and long term contracts as the 
most eﬀ ective way to achieve this goal. Qatar is in a distinctly diﬀ erent position, being the world’s largest LNG 
exporter. Th e Qataris made signiﬁ cant investments in developing LNG technologies and know-how, and they 
have little incentive to enter into a formal alliance with Russia, which is almost exclusively oriented towards a 
continental pipeline market. Like Qatar, Algeria has relatively well-developed LNG production, but also has 
signiﬁ cant pipeline exports to Europe. However, Algerian reserves, albeit signiﬁ cant, do not match those of 
Qatar, and, in the long run, the Algerians may have an interest in gaining access to the Russian ﬁ elds. 
Most experts agree that a potential gas cartel would only be possible if a truly global market for natural gas 
developed. Such a development can only take place if LNG plays a much larger role relative to pipeline delivery. 
Otherwise, prices will continue to be based on the speciﬁ c features of each market, preventing any possibility for 
agreement. Currently, LNG trade accounts for less than 10 percent of global gas trade. Given the costs involved 
in developing the infrastructure to support a global LNG market, the possibility that a real world market based 
on LNG will emerge is a distant prospect at best. Moreover, if Russia – which is years behind countries like Qatar 
and Algeria in terms of LNG technology – resists the trend because of its continued focus on pipelines and long-
term contracts, the market might well remain fragmented for a long time.
Th e size of investments in gas projects is also likely to be an important consideration in setting up capacity 
control mechanisms in a potential cartel. Indeed, a key condition in eﬀ ectively controlling world prices is the 
ability to regulate capacity expansion and enforce quotas. Maintaining such oversight is likely to prove extremely 
challenging because the costs of gas development projects are enormous, and it will be very diﬃ  cult for any 
producer artiﬁ cially to slow down capacity expansion and restrain production given the massive opportunity 
costs involved. In the oil market, Saudi Arabia traditionally plays the role of swing producer by maintaining 
spare capacity, but it is unclear how this could be achieved with gas. Russia, which given the size of its reserves 
has often been described as a good candidate for the role of swing producer, is unlikely to have any real incen-
tive to play this role. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Russia has a very large population and rising domestic gas demand. 
It would be politically damaging for any leader to maintain costly spare capacity under such conditions. Gas 
storage is very expensive and creates an additional obstacle to establishing spare capacity. 
A further obstacle to creating an eﬀ ective cartel is that unlike oil, gas has to compete against other types of 
resources. While petroleum cannot – at the moment – be replaced with other sources of energy in the transpor-
tation sector, gas in electricity and heating has to compete with alternative sources, such as oil, coal, hydro, and 
nuclear. As a result, producers have to be more careful about the risk of losing their market if price setting mech-
anisms seem unreliable to the consumer.
Other Forms of Producer’s Agreements
If a real “gas-OPEC” is unlikely, one has to accept that other types of producers’ agreements short of a formal 
alliance might emerge, at least with regard to certain regional markets. For example, LNG-exporters might have 
a real interest in working out production control agreements. LNG is traded separately on diﬀ erent regional 
markets, and prices are set in relation to diﬀ erent competing energy sources. Exporters in the Atlantic Basin 
in particular, may ﬁ nd it easier to establish common rules to cartelize this speciﬁ c market, where spot-trading 
is expanding more rapidly than on other markets and where cooperation among the main players may be eas-
ier to achieve because of convergent interests. 
Another idea proposed by Vladimir Putin is more straightforward bilateral coordination on energy proj-
ects. In this respect, Russia’s current deal with Algeria might have a particular signiﬁ cance. Th e agreement 
provides for a swap of upstream assets between Sonatrach and Gazprom, as well as possibilities for Gazprom 
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to play a role in the distribution and marketing of Algerian gas to Europe. Th e source of potential worry for 
Europe, which views Algeria as an important component of its diversiﬁ cation strategy in gas imports, is not 
so much the creation of a full-ﬂ edged gas cartel. It is, rather, the fact that Algeria has a large outstanding debt 
to Russia related to recent large weapons purchases, which may weaken its ability to push ahead with projects 
that are not in Russia’s interest. Indeed, Algeria’s bilateral agreements in the economic and military spheres 
taken together put Russia in a position where it might be able to exert signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence in order to prevent 
projects that compete with its own plans. Russia has a history of such practices: one example is the agreement 
between Russia and Turkmenistan, which allows Russia to purchase virtually all Turkmen gas until 2028 at 
a comparatively high price, in eﬀ ect preventing the construction of any infrastructure projects linking Turk-
menistan more closely to China. Such practices are common commercial behavior, but they may not always be 
in Europe’s interest if competing projects were designed to build a more diversiﬁ ed supply. 
Putin’s idea that Qatar and Russia should cooperate more closely to ensure they will not be competing for 
markets seems rather unlikely to be realized. Qatar is planning to increase LNG exports not only to the US, 
but also to Europe in the near future. Th ese intentions play well into Europe’s strategy of import diversiﬁ ca-
tion, and the Europeans will be willing to pay high prices to achieve this objective. Furthermore, any agreement 
between Russia and Qatar would undermine the two sides’ ability to compete for the best and most advanta-
geous prices in this lucrative market. In this case, competition seems inevitable. 
Both Russia and Iran have raised the possibility of collaboration, but the political obstacles are signiﬁ cant. 
As long as the nuclear issue is not resolved, Russia will not engage in serious collaboration in the energy sector 
because doing so would provoke a major dispute with Europe, its main consumer, and because emboldening 
Iran is not necessarily in Russia’s interest either. In the medium run, it is not clear that the two countries would 
really have an interest in cooperation since they are likely to compete for the same markets. It seems unlikely 
that a country like Iran, which has an enormous potential for future exports to Europe that are not reﬂ ected 
in current sales, would want to agree on market shares at this point. On the Russian side, there are no incen-
tives to help a competitor emerge from its current state of isolation. 
Russia’s Risky Strategy
While several Russian Duma members claim that a gas alliance would boost Russian interests, a closer look at 
Putin’s declarations reveals a much more prudent approach. His cautious language demonstrates a clear real-
ization that it is not in the interest of Russia to create an organization that will push its customers to diver-
sify away from natural gas. Indeed, as noted above, natural gas competes against other sources of energy for 
most of its end-uses. Th e emergence of an organization like OPEC for gas could well tip the balance in favor 
of other sources for many consumers. 
In this light, one may wonder why the Kremlin has frayed European nerves by repeatedly discussing the 
possibility of a gas OPEC only to contradict itself in subsequent statements? Th e answer might well be that it 
is a purely tactical move. One hypothesis is that by convincing many Europeans that a gas OPEC is a realis-
tic threat, Putin can gain a valuable bargaining chip. Even if he realizes a gas OPEC is never going to happen, 
maybe Europeans, blinded by fear, do not. Th e next step is to ask for something in return for dropping the 
idea of a gas cartel. Th e Europeans may allow Gazprom to make controversial acquisitions in the European 
distribution markets for instance, if in return they receive assurances from Putin that a gas cartel will not be 
formed. Or they may be much more careful when it comes to placing U.S. missiles close to Russia’s borders. 
Th e irony being of course, that experts (and maybe Russian oﬃ  cials too) have long understood that a gas car-
tel was not something that really made any sense. 
Russia has embarked on a risky strategy, and it may well backﬁ re. In March, the Europeans agreed for the 
ﬁ rst time on common targets for bio-fuels, renewable energy technologies and carbon emission reductions, 
objectives that will decrease Russian and European interdependence and reduce Russia’s ability to achieve 
demand security. Th is new consensus among the Europeans certainly is a consequence of the recent threaten-
ing discourse Russia has adopted. 
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Russia’s New Political Leadership and its Implication for East Siberian 
Development and Energy Cooperation with North East Asian States
By Yoshinori Takeda, Moscow
Abstract
Th e transition from Putin to Medvedev marks an important new beginning for the future of East 
Siberian energy resources and their impact on Russia’s Asian neighbors. East Siberian resources have 
not been developed, but could have great impact on Russia’s relations with Asia. China currently has 
the best relations with Russia, while Japan has made little progress, and Korea has secured one major 
deal. Th e Korean arrangements with Russia could serve as a model for future ties because they strongly 
favor the Russian side, which maintains a 60 percent share of the project while taking on little risk. 
In the future, Russia’s energy decisions will continue to have strong political motivations, but they 
will be based on better deﬁ ned rules of the game. Essentially, Russia will use its energy resources to 
develop the Russian state and only allow foreign companies to participate in projects that meet Rus-
sia’s national interest.
From Putin to Medvedev
Th e process of political and economic modernization in Russia entered a new phase on December 10, 2007, 
when President Vladimir Putin chose First Deputy Prime-Minister Dmitri Medvedev as Russia’s next presi-
dent. Medvedev’s nomination clearly demonstrates that over the next four years Russia will seek further eco-
nomic growth and the social welfare beneﬁ ts that derive from such growth. Medvedev has been a close ally of 
Putin’s for the last decade, but he is not a former secret service oﬃ  cer. In addition, Medvedev is less hawkish 
than others surrounding Putin. 
Meanwhile, the Russian government is moving extremely slowly in diversifying the economy, a move seen 
as necessary to ensure continuing economic prosperity regardless of the cost of raw materials. Since almost 
70 percent of Russia’s budget revenues and export value derive from primary commodities, Medvedev will have 
to take serious measures towards economic diversiﬁ cation while Russia remains dependent upon oil and gas. 
Against a backdrop of historically high oil prices, this economic course would help Russia pursue its geopolit-
ical strategy in the foreseeable future and lead the nation to a position of global inﬂ uence and power with its 
oil and gas reserves.
Among Russia’s oil deposits, East Siberia is the most underdeveloped region. In 2006, its total crude oil 
production amounted to only 0.7 million tons, or 0.1 percent of the national total. Although East Siberia’s oil 
reserve is estimated to be approximately 75 billion barrels (10.2 billion tons), proven crude amounts are only 
7 billion barrels. In addition, exploration has barely begun beyond two ﬁ elds – the Verkhnechon ﬁ eld in the 
Irkutsk region and the Talakan ﬁ eld in the Sakha republic. Even Putin, who has shown intense interest in 
the economic and social development of East Siberia and the Far East by funding a federal program for the 
region’s growth with $24 billion from the state budget in 2007, has done little to spur a search for crude oil in 
East Siberia. For Medvedev, encouraging exploitation of new ﬁ elds may be key to averting an expected future 
drop in Russia’s oil output. It may also provide important leverage vis-à-vis Asian countries, especially China, 
Japan and South Korea.
Russian-Asian Energy Relations: Current Circumstances
Th roughout the second term of Putin’s presidency, China has been undoubtedly the front-runner in energy 
cooperation with Russia. A major milestone of Sino-Russia energy relations was the $6 billion loan from the 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to Russia’s highest-producing state-owned oil company, Ros-
neft, in early 2005. Th is ﬁ nancial resource made it possible for Rosneft to purchase Yuganskneftegaz, the main 
subsidiary of the former Yukos, at a state-run auction. 2005–2006 saw a series of important deals between Mos-
cow and Beijing: Rosneft and CNPC formed a joint venture for upstream projects in East Siberia; CNPC and 
Transneft, Russia’s state-owned oil pipeline monopoly, agreed to build a Chinese branch of the East Siberia – 
Paciﬁ c Ocean oil pipeline project (ESPO) funded with Chinese money; and CNPC and Gazprom, the world’s 
No. 1 gas company, proposed an ambitious plan to build two huge gas pipelines to China by 2011. Th ese proj-
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ects are, however, being very slowly developed. While Vostok Energy, the joint company established by Ros-
neft and CNPC, won two small oil and gas wells in East Siberia at an auction for $45 million, the spur of the 
ESPO has not yet reached the Sino-Russian border, and the gas pipeline projects are on the verge of collapse.
Japanese-Russian energy talks have been held around the ESPO project (a pipeline originating in East Sibe-
ria in Taishet, Irkutsk region, and extending to a Paciﬁ c port at Kozmino bay, in the Primorsk region). Regard-
ing this colossal venture, Japan took the position that pipeline economics was not an issue since governments 
(Russia, Japan and other countries concerned) could provide long-term credits, tax exemptions and subsidies 
to lower the pipeline’s cost. Th is perspective led Tokyo to raise two points at the negotiating table: exploring 
reserves in East Siberia and funding for feasibility studies and the construction itself. However, no real progress 
in Japanese-Russian cooperation in ESPO construction, including upstream projects in East Siberia, has been 
reported so far. In the meantime, Japanese companies have begun to show interest in other spheres of energy 
relations, like participating in Gazprom’s projects and Rosneft’s downstream business (such as oil reﬁ neries).
Th e South Korean economy is not as large as that of China or Japan and, consequently, its energy coopera-
tion with Russia is not substantial, so far. Still, the South Korean national oil company (Korean National Oil 
Corporation, KNOC) and Rosneft have made one impressive agreement to develop the West Kamchatka shelf 
that is estimated to hold about 900 million tons of oil equivalents at 26 sites. Th is deal will become a good 
model for Asian countries aiming at pragmatic energy cooperation with Russian state-owned oil companies for 
two reasons. First, KNOC could successfully avoid the strategic ﬁ elds issue. While the Kremlin’s deﬁ nition of 
the phrase “strategic ﬁ eld” is not clear and is mostly subjective, one thing is beyond doubt: the participation of 
foreign companies in projects at strategic deposits is highly politicized and strictly limited. West Kamchatka, 
however, is apparently not a strategic ﬁ eld for Moscow due to its geographical location (11,000 kilometers, or 
6,900 miles from Moscow) and the volume of its deposit. Second, the Koreans have agreed to two key condi-
tions and thus could satisfy Rosneft. Th e ﬁ rst condition is a 60–40 share division, i.e. Rosneft holds a 60 per-
cent share of this project. Th is number is important for Rosneft, which wants to promote projects with foreign-
ers from a superior position. Th e other condition is that the Korean company will invest in prospecting oper-
ations, taking on 100 percent of the risk in exploration, and Rosneft will be able to claim a share of the reve-
nues once commercial production begins.
After 2008: a New Hope for Foreigners, including Russia’s Asian Neighbors
Th e slow development of Russian energy cooperation mentioned above has been a problem, not only for Asian 
countries, but for the U.S. and European partners, as well. Political uncertainties in 2007, due mainly to the 
lack of clarity about Putin’s successor, and the lack of clear rules of the game in Russia’s energy policy delayed 
many projects, while Russia’s federal budget enjoyed extra revenues thanks to record-high oil prices. 
Perhaps 2008 will see a change in such circumstances. Medvedev’s presidency will bring some new ele-
ments into Russia’s energy policy, including its relations with East Siberia. In attempting to read the future of 
East Siberia and its implications for Asian countries, it is worth paying attention to two points: political moti-
vation and the formation of the rules of the game.
Political Motivation
Undoubtedly, Moscow can now eﬀ ectively use its energy resources as tools of geopolitical strategy; i.e. most 
of the Kremlin’s decisions on energy issues are politically motivated. Since 2000, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin has strongly driven foreign and domestic policy under the slogan of a “strong and self-conﬁ dent Russia.” 
During the eight years of his presidency, the world’s macroeconomic climate, including exceedingly high-priced 
fossil fuels, allowed Russia to consolidate its role in global politics and markets, especially in the energy ﬁ eld. 
In spite of criticism from the West towards Moscow’s energy leverage, we see no setback to Russia’s geopoliti-
cal strategy using its rich energy resources. On the contrary, Russia is coming to a position of global inﬂ uence 
and power with its oil and gas reserves.
Political incentive plays all the more vital a role in the development of East Siberia because, without spe-
cial arrangements by the government, it is almost impossible, even for ineﬃ  cient Russian state-owned compa-
nies, to tap new resources that sit under one of the world’s most forbidding terrains. Tax holidays of up to ten 
years for companies developing oil deposits in East Siberia introduced by the Russian government in 2006 are 
a case in point. Th en Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref explained the reason for this 
move, saying that the tax holiday decision and the ESPO project would help increase oil production in East 
Siberia. Moreover, the Kremlin has a strong political motive to utilize Rosneft and Surgutneftegaz, fourth in 
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oil output among Russia’s oil companies and totally loyal to Putin, as tools of East Siberian development. In 
May 2007, Surgutneftegaz’s CEO Vladimir Bogndanov, announced that the company’s future production in 
West Siberia would be ﬂ at, with all its output growth likely to come from East Siberia.
Th is political motivation will certainly lead the Siberian pipeline to the Paciﬁ c Ocean, despite uncertainty 
over the oil reserves and the proﬁ tability of this pipeline. 2007 saw some negative elements in the construction 
of the ESPO: a serious delay in the ESPO’s ﬁ rst stage construction (up to Skovorodino, a town in the Irkutsk 
region near the Sino-Russian border) and the postponement of the start of the ESPO’s second stage construc-
tion (to Kozmino bay). However, one should take into account the fact that the ESPO is Putin’s project. His 
involvement practically assures the completion of this gigantic project, despite the many negative observations 
uttered by oﬃ  cials and specialists. A scenario in which the pipeline is not built can be excluded. 
Th e Rules of the Game
Th e formation of the rules of the game in Russia’s energy policy is another decisive factor that could encourage 
fundamental progress in energy-related business. Actually, throughout the eight years of Putin’s presidency, espe-
cially after the Yukos aﬀ air in 2003, unwritten rules have been formulated. Th e essential one is simple: Russia 
has enormous natural resources and should utilize them eﬀ ectively to attain the social and economic develop-
ment of the state. Two more fundamental unwritten rules can be added: ﬁ rst, the state must control the export 
of its resources; second, foreign investors are welcome only when they are ready to participate in projects that 
answer principally to Russia’s national interests.
Now, Moscow is moving to the formation of clear rules, particularly with the adoption of a new version 
of the subsoil law. For most of Putin’s presidency there has been a heated discussion on the bill amending the 
existing subsoil law. Th e crucial issue over the proposed amendment is the extent of foreign companies’ access 
to Russian deposits. Until quite recently, the draft completely prevented foreigners from working strategic 
deposits, which undoubtedly means all large promising oil and gas ﬁ elds and whose ultimate deﬁ nition will 
depend on the Kremlin’s subjective decisions. After the nomination of Medvedev, a new move appeared: Min-
ister of Natural Resources Yuri Trutnev stated that his ministry would make a change in the bill and that all 
issues, including foreigners’ participation in strategic deposits and foreigners’ access will be discussed by a gov-
ernment committee.
Who Wins?
Th e idea of establishing a government committee will not increase the transparency of the decision-making 
process, which is an essential element of corporate governance in the West, but will only add to the existing 
impression of decision-making behind closed doors. Th e important point is, however, that the Russian gov-
ernment has expressed its intention to form rules of the game in energy policy. After the long-term twists and 
turns in the amendments to the subsoil law, the bill will be approved by the newly formed State Duma in the 
near future, perhaps under Medvedev’s presidency. Now, it is clear that political motivation and rules of the 
game matter for everyone who wants to proﬁ t from Russia’s natural resources.
As discussed above, these two factors are decisive for East Siberian development since it requires strong 
political will and enormous funding. Among potential foreign partners, China is already two-three steps ahead 
since Beijing understands well the importance of the political incentive and has successfully formed a stra-
tegic partnership relationship with Moscow in recent years. Moreover, China and India, which buy Russia’s 
military weapons and satisfy Moscow with the formation of a trilateral grouping against U.S. unilateral hege-
mony, enjoy the advantages of barter trade with Russia and are ready to join upstream projects in East Sibe-
ria. However, Japan, South Korea, and even the United States and European countries are not too late for this 
race. Th e winner will be the one that understands Moscow’s rules of the game and can utilize Russia’s politi-
cal motivation and its own capital. 
About the author:
Yoshinori Takeda is a Japanese diplomat in Moscow. Th is paper represents the author’s personal views and 
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Part IV: Ecological Challenges

Russia and Global Warming – Implications for the Energy Industry 
By Roland Götz, Berlin
Abstract
Climate change could make it more expensive to extract oil and natural gas from current and future 
sites in Russia. Th e melting of the permafrost, in particular, will impose a wide variety of costs. Many 
of these consequences are already being felt in Alaska. However, as long as oil and natural gas prices 
remain high, these projects will remain proﬁ table.
Siberian Extraction Fields Moving North and East
Th e main Russian oil and natural gas extraction ﬁ elds are currently in the northern part of Western Siberia. 
Because the deposits there are largely depleted, new oil and gas ﬁ elds must be developed. New reserves are 
located in the northern coastal areas of Siberia and in the east of the country. In the future, natural gas will 
mostly be extracted on the Yamal Peninsula, oﬀ shore in the Barents Sea (Shtokman Field), and the Kara Sea, 
as well as in Eastern Siberia and in the Far East, on the Sakhalin Peninsula. 
Th e distances for transporting resources from the new production zones to the consumer centers in West-
ern Russia and Europe will be greater than for current production. Additionally, extraction and overhead costs 
will also increase because of the extreme climate with long and frigidly cold winters and the diﬃ  cult hydrolog-
ical conditions in the future production areas.
Russia has already invested enormous technical and ﬁ nancial eﬀ ort into the current oil and gas extraction 
facilities, as well as pipeline construction in the Western Siberian taiga, since large swathes of that area are cov-
ered by swamps. Trains, roads, industrial facilities, and even entire settlements had to be constructed on sand 
foundations. Th e expansion of natural gas extraction to the tundra north of the taiga creates additional prob-
lems because that area is covered by permafrost.
Permafrost
Permafrost is permanently frozen ground varying in depth between several meters and several hundred meters, 
depending on air and ground temperatures and the properties of the soil. In Siberia, permafrost soil can be 
found reaching down to several thousand meters. Th e top, or “active” layer, thaws in spring and summer to a 
depth of between several centimeters and several meters, and then freezes again.
When the “active” layer melts in spring, the water cannot drain oﬀ  because of the frozen ground below. Th e 
result is the formation of pools and lakes as habitats for plants that subsequently decompose. Because of the 
cold and wet climate, more humus is produced than can decompose, and peat is formed. Th erefore, the per-
mafrost soil in Siberia consists mainly of frozen peat soil containing ice deposits. When this ground ice melts, 
ground depressions are formed. Th e result is a hilly landscape known as thermokarst. Water aggregates in the 
hollow depressions, and lakes are formed.
During the summer, part of the organic material in the thawed ground is converted by microorganisms into 
methane and carbon dioxide, and these greenhouse gases are released into the atmosphere. All of these eﬀ ects 
are reinforced and accelerated by global warming, speeding up the process.
Global Warming and the Th awing of the Permafrost 
Th e temperature of the ground in Russia is rising at an accelerating rate. It rose by 0.4 ºC just between 1990 
and 2000, while the overall increase in the previous 100 years had been 1 ºC. Russian oﬃ  cials expect a fur-
ther increase by 2030, as described in Figure 1 overleaf. 
Since the 1980s, temperatures in diﬀ erent parts of Siberia have risen between several tenths of a degree and two 
degrees. Th e result is that the permafrost thaws to increasingly deeper levels during the summer, and the thick-
ness of the “active” layer grows. Th aw periods begin earlier in the year and end later. Plant growth is boosted 
and the volume of greenhouse gas emissions increases.
Th e melting of the snow cover and the spread of dark water patches accelerate the thaw of the permafrost. 
In winter, conversely, the ground freezes more slowly because the water serves as an insulating layer. Th e out-
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come is a self-reinforcing process of per-
mafrost thawing. In the southern perma-
frost regions, the permafrost soil ﬁ nally 
vanishes completely, the ground dries out, 
and the permafrost border moves further 
north.
Th e thawing of Siberia’s peat bogs, 
which has been happening for several 
years at an unexpectedly rapid pace, not 
only releases the carbon-dioxide that is 
captured inside of them, but also changes 
the soil composition. Th is process creates 
thermokarst, resulting in depressed areas 
and lake formation. Th e ground thaws to 
deeper levels and remains unfrozen lon-
ger than before.
Eﬀ ects on the Economy
Researchers are already studying the 
eﬀ ects of global warming, and speciﬁ -
cally the thawing permafrost through-
out the arctic region, on living conditions 
and the economy in Siberia. However, the 
public largely ignored these investigations for a long time – a situation that has only recently begun to change. 
It was not until 2005, when Judith Marquand (University of Oxford/England) and Sergey Kirpotin (Univer-
sity of Tomsk/Russia) reported on the increasing thaw of the permafrost soil in Siberia, that the issue began 
to receive broader media coverage. Independently, the Russian state’s Federal Hydrometeorology and Envi-
ronmental Observation Service (Roshydromet) in 2005 presented a “Strategic Forecast of Climate Change in 
the Russian Federation 2010–2015 and Its Impact on Sectors of the Russian Economy.” It is the ﬁ rst report 
by a respected Russian institution to acknowledge the dangers from climate change by 2015 for human settle-
ments, infrastructure, and the economy.
According to this report, some of the key current extraction areas for natural gas in Western Siberia and the 
future natural gas production regions on the Yamal Peninsula will be aﬀ ected by thawing permafrost soil. Th e 
period during which the frozen ground can be traversed by vehicles will be reduced, making the development 
of new extraction areas more diﬃ  cult. Buildings, traﬃ  c routes, and industrial facilities that are not anchored 
to suﬃ  ciently strong foundations will be threatened as the shifting ground endangers their structural stability. 
Likewise, oil and gas pipelines operating at high pressure could suﬀ er damage. Pipelines and other oil and gas 
extraction facilities will require repairs more often. Pipelines constructed before 1990 are particularly likely 
to suﬀ er disruptions. In the Arctic Ocean, the danger of icebergs will increase, threatening not only shipping, 
but also oil and gas drilling rigs. High waves and storms will occur more frequently, impeding shipping and 
therefore maritime supply lines.
Consequences
In order to minimize the consequences of the shrinking Siberian permafrost for the Russian economy, espe-
cially the energy industry, the existing infrastructure, such as mining facilities, pipelines, compressor sta-
tions, storage tanks, auxiliary buildings, and the roads and railways leading to the oil and gas ﬁ elds, will 
need to be moored more ﬁ rmly in the ground than is currently the case. New extraction and pipeline proj-
ects must be designed and built accordingly.
Pipelines can either be supported by struts driven into the frozen ground or designed as subterranean 
conduits. In the latter case, however, they must be insulated to avoid any further underground thaws. In 
both cases, the melting permafrost layer problem complicates construction plans. Investments for the proj-
ects in question will be higher than originally projected. Since the period in which ice roads can be traversed 
during the winter will be shorter, supplies will increasingly need to be ﬂ own in by aircraft. Th e builders of 
Figure 1: Average Increase of Ground-Level Air Temperature in Russia by 
2030, Compared to 1971–2000.*
* Surface air temperature rise in Russia computed with a group of models up 
to 2030, relative to the reference value of 1971–2000, based on computa-
tions made by the Voeikov Main Geophysical Observatory. Th e range of the 
diﬀ erent models included in the group is described by the grey region, which 
comprises 75 percent of the average model values. A 95 percent conﬁ dence 
interval of temperature changes averaged over the group of models is speciﬁ ed 
by two horizontal lines.
Source: Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring 
(Roshydromet), Strategic Forecast of Climate Change in the Russian Federation 
2010–2015 and Its Impact on Sectors of the Russian Economy (Moscow 2005), 
www.meteorf.ru/en_default.aspx.
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the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System have already had to contend with this problem. A 2003 study prepared 
by the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) examining the consequences of climate change 
in Alaska state that:
“Building on permafrost can incur a signiﬁ cant cost because it requires that structures be stabilized in 
permanently frozen ground below the active layer, and that they limit their heat transfer to the ground, 
usually by elevating them on piles. For example, to prevent thawing of permafrost from transport of 
heated oil in the Trans-Alaska pipeline, 400 miles of pipeline were elevated on thermosyphon piles (to 
keep the ground frozen), at an additional cost of $800 million. Th e pipeline was completed at a cost of 
$7 billion because of ice-rich permafrost along the route. Th is ﬁ gure is eight times the estimated cost of 
installing the traditional in-ground pipeline. 
Breaks in the pipeline and other repair costs due to melting permafrost could become even more signiﬁ -
cant in the future. Th e near-term risk of disruption to operations of the Trans-Alaska pipeline is judged to 
be small, although costly increases in maintenance due to increased ground instability are likely. Th e pipe-
line’s support structures are designed for speciﬁ c ranges of ground temperatures, and are subject to heaving 
or collapse if the permafrost thaws. Replacing them, if required, would cost about $2 million per mile.
Th awing of ice-rich discontinuous permafrost has already damaged houses, roads, airports, pipelines, and 
military installations; required costly road replacements and increased maintenance expenditures for pipe-
lines and other infrastructure; and increased landscape erosion, slope instabilities and landslides. Because 
of melting permafrost, buildings already have been abandoned, including homes, a radio transmitter site 
near Fairbanks, and a hospital at Kotzebue, to name a few. Th e impact on subsistence communities has also 
been seen, is expected to increase, and is diﬃ  cult to quantify in dollars. Alaska’s warming climate has, for 
example, thawed traditional ice cellars in several northern villages, rendering them useless.
Present costs of thaw-related damage to structures and infrastructure in Alaska have been estimated at 
about $35 million per year, of which repair of permafrost-damaged roads is the largest component. Lon-
ger seasonal thaw of the active layer could disrupt petroleum exploration and extraction and increase asso-
ciated environmental damage in the tundra, by shortening the season for minimal-impact operations on 
ice roads and pads.”
Th ere may be some advantages from climate change to the Russian energy industry. Global warming will fur-
ther reduce the freezing of the northern seas and will make maritime routes more easily navigable with and 
without icebreakers. It is likely that the northern sea route from the Atlantic to the Paciﬁ c will be ice-free for 
part of the year, and eventually all year round. Th is would allow oil and liqueﬁ ed natural gas to be transported 
by tanker from the northern coasts of Russia west- or eastwards. Only short pipelines to the northern ports 
will be required, while the up to 5,000 km of pipelines running from Western Siberia to Europe may not be 
overhauled after the end of their life cycle.
Nevertheless, the thaw of the permafrost ground is likely to increase the costs of natural gas and oil extrac-
tion in the very parts of Siberia where extraction is already expensive today. Since the price of natural gas in 
Europe is linked to the price of oil, and not to the extraction costs for gas, however, consumers will not notice 
the changing prices.
Should the price of oil, and therefore the price of natural gas in the European market, remain high, planned 
major projects for natural gas extraction in Russia will remain proﬁ table and will proceed. However, Gazprom 
will exert even greater pressure to raise its gas prices to the European levels both domestically and in transac-
tions with CIS customers.
As predictions regarding the outcomes of global warming remain uncertain at this point, the future amount 
of thawing in the permafrost layer can only be forecast to a limited extent. Both acceleration and delays of this 
process are possible. Should the consequences outlined above for Russia be conﬁ rmed, however, many more 
capital investments will be required to maintain or increase oil and natural gas extraction. Such expenditures 
will be forthcoming as long as oil and related natural gas prices remain at high levels.
Translated from German by Christopher Findlay
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Energy Savings in Russia – Political Challenges and Economic 
Potential
By Petra Opitz, Berlin
Abstract
Russia’s economy is one of the most energy ineﬃ  cient and carbon dioxide (CO2) intensive in the 
world. Russia produces as much CO2  per capita as Germany, yet the amount of energy consumed per 
unit of Russian gross domestic product (GDP), measured in purchasing power parity, is almost three 
times larger than in Germany. Th ere are numerous ways that Russia could save energy, but currently 
the incentives are not right to encourage such savings. Although Russia’s leaders talk about this prob-
lem, they will need political will to implement eﬀ ective solutions.
Russian Energy Eﬃ  ciency Lags Behind Western Standards 
Russia’s Energy Strategy until 2020, which was adopted in 2003, assumes a tripling of the GDP with only a 
40 percent increase in energy consumption. Russia’s leaders hope to achieve this goal by implementing techno-
logical and organizational energy-saving measures, as well as introducing structural changes in the economy. 
Th ese scenario planners estimated Russia’s energy saving potential to be about 278 million tons of oil equiv-
alent (Mtoe). Th is amount corresponds to 43 percent of Russia’s primary energy consumption during 2004, or 
twice the current exports of natural gas to the European Union. 
In fact, the assumptions of the Energy Strategy turned out to be too conservative for the period 2000–2004, 
underestimating Russia’s real energy eﬃ  ciency potential. Estimates for 2006 show that GDP growth until 2006 
was much higher, 43.9 percent compared to 2000, than the forecasted 33.9 percent, but energy consumption 
was less than (2005) or equal to (2006) the forecast. Th erefore, energy intensity decreased more (up to 23.3 per-
cent compared to 2000) than assumed in the Energy Strategy to 2020 (about 17.7 percent). Th is achievement 
was mainly the result of a more rapid structural change of the GDP then previously expected. Th e share of the 
low energy intensive sectors has increased considerably more rapidly than the other sectors. 
According to the Energy Strategy, in 2020 Russia’s GDP should reach an energy intensity level of about 
0.29 kgoe/USD (PPP) [kilograms of oil equivalent per dollar at purchasing power parity] (See Figure 1 on p. 92). 
If so, Russia’s economy in 2020 would still be twice as energy intensive as today’s EU average. Th us, Russia’s gains 
in energy eﬃ  ciency are more than anticipated, but far below what potentially could be achieved. 
Enormous Potential for Energy Savings
Russia can realize much of its energy saving potential at low cost. According to Russian Ministry of Industry 
and Energy estimates, approximately 20 percent of the energy saving potential can be achieved for as little as 
$20–$50/t of coal equivalent. 
A closer look at the structure of Russia’s energy eﬃ  ciency potential shows that the main opportunities for 
savings are within the energy sector and the communal services sector (see Figure 2 on p. 92). 
Major eﬃ  ciency potentials within the energy sector are:
Reducing the amount of ﬂ ared gas at Russian oil wells and converting this gas to energy. Estimates about • 
the amount of gas ﬂ aring in Russia range from 15 to 42 billion cubic meters (bn m³), creating between 43 
and 124 million tons of CO2.
Cutting losses in natural gas transmission and distribution. Losses amounted to about 10 percent of the • 
656 bn m³ transported in 2006, or approximately 65 bn m³. Up to 20–25 bn m³ of these losses could be 
prevented, according to World Bank estimates. Th us, about 3–4 percent of current natural gas produc-
tion could be saved. 
Increasing the eﬃ  ciency of oil reﬁ neries. About 50 mn t of oil could be saved annually if the processing • 
depth of Russia’s reﬁ neries reached 90 percent. 
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Replacing outdated power stations with modern gas-steam turbines and gas turbines. An annual savings of • 
about 50 bn m³ of natural gas could be achieved. 
Improving the domestic heating system. 70 percent of Russia’s heating comes from centralized heat supply • 
systems. Experts have identiﬁ ed the potential for huge energy savings in the heat generating process, par-
ticularly by replacing outdated boilers with combined heat and power generators (CHP) and modernizing 
more than 48,000 small boilers with an eﬃ  ciency factor of ≤ 30%. In addition, losses in the heat supply 
systems, which on average amount to 8.6 percent of the heat generated could be substantially reduced and 
the fuel mix in heat generation could be improved. 
Additionally, Russian industry has an enormous potential for introducing greater energy savings. Th e energy 
eﬃ  ciency of many technologies is still far below respective standards in Europe and even the US. For exam-
ple, the energy intensity of technologies in the iron and steel sectors is about 0.31 toe/t in Russia compared 
to 0.17 toe/t in the US, 0.12 toe/t in Germany, and 0.1 toe/t in Japan. Also, in the chemical industry, non-
metal primary industry, and food industry, the energy intensity is twice as high as in Germany. Russia’s min-
imum energy eﬃ  ciency requirements are below international standards. Convergence in this ﬁ eld would help 
to increase the international competitiveness of Russian products.
Nearly one third of Russia’s ability to save energy lies in the communal and housing sector. Due to institu-
tional barriers, such as ownership questions, tariﬀ s, and metering/billing issues, this potential remains almost 
untapped. Establishing apartment owner communities, which would essentially amount to converting Rus-
sian apartments into condominiums, will help to establish the legal basis for ﬁ nancing investment into refur-
bishing existing buildings, where energy eﬃ  ciency measures will be one important component. In terms of 
energy pricing, state subsidies remain in place and few politicians want to risk public ire in removing them. 
Finally, thanks to Soviet era practices, when there were no meters on individual apartments, it is very diﬃ  cult 
to measure and charge for individual consumption and therefore hard to encourage individuals to save energy 
by raising prices. Russia has introduced a number of communal housing sectors reforms to address these prob-
lems, but the process is only moving forward slowly. 
Obstacles to Reform
Why has Russia been so slow in taking advantage of its huge potential to improve energy eﬃ  ciency? For exam-
ple, Russia could save large amounts of natural gas, which would then be available for export. Th ere should be 
interest in using this potential.
Many proposed projects seeking to reduce natural gas consumption for domestic heating by introducing 
individual meters into private households, making it possible to bill households for their real heat consump-
tion, were not implemented. Although the legislation is in place for this reform, actual progress has been slow. 
Th e main problem is the institutional structure of the heating sector, which is dominated by badly regulated 
supply monopolies. At present, they have almost no incentive to save energy since they can easily transfer their 
huge energy losses to the ﬁ nal costumers. 
For natural gas supplier monopolist Gazprom, there are low incentives for energy savings on the consumer 
side. Many experts assert that Gazprom could beneﬁ t from energy savings on Russia’s domestic market, where 
it must sell gas at regulated prices that are much lower than world prices, by making available additional 
amounts of gas for export to foreign markets, where international prices prevail. In practice, however, the sit-
uation is much more complicated and interests are diﬀ erent. Currently, Gazprom has no need to receive addi-
tional amounts of natural gas for export, because current contracts are secured over the next several years. If 
external demand for gas goes up in the future, Gazprom certainly will calculate which gas potentials to exploit 
at least cost. If exploiting the energy saving potential of the internal Russian market costs less than exploring 
and developing new gas ﬁ elds or buying gas from Turkmenistan, Gazprom would have greater incentives to 
focus on increasing eﬃ  ciencies. While exploiting new ﬁ elds is expected to be extremely expensive, Gazprom 
currently is able to acquire relatively cheap gas from Turkmenistan.
In addition, the Energy Strategy until 2020 assumes that the structure of Russia’s domestic energy demand 
should be changed in favor of increasing the share of coal burned in the country in order to fulﬁ ll future obli-
gations in natural gas exports. Pursuing this strategy would, of course, increase Russia’s CO2 emissions. If, 
instead, Russia could take advantage of greater energy savings, there would be no need to burn more coal. 
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In Europe, a strong desire to mitigate climate change and the Kyoto Protocol provide strong incentives for 
developing energy eﬃ  ciency potentials. In Russia, such incentives have much less inﬂ uence. According to the Kyoto 
Protocol, Russia must hold greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the level of 1990. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
the Russian economy contracted and GHG emissions dropped sharply. In parallel with the country’s recent eco-
nomic recovery, emissions started to rise again, but most likely Russia will be able to meet its quantitative Kyoto 
commitments easily without further domestic measures. In 2004 Russia’s GHG emissions reached a level some 
33 percent below its Kyoto commitments. Th us, it has a surplus of Assigned Amount of Emissions (AAUs) of 
about 1 billion metric tons carbon equivalent (mtce) until 2012. 
Using Joint Implementation (JI) under the Kyoto Protocol could provide new incentives for investing in 
energy eﬃ  ciency projects by providing co-ﬁ nancing from selling Estimated Ultimate Recoveries (EURs) cre-
ated by the projects. Western companies are strongly interested in such projects. On May 30, 2007, the Rus-
sian government issued a decree on the national JI procedure, which now allows for implementing the JI mech-
anism in Russia. Despite this advance, at the project level, the incentives to reduce CO2 emissions have much 
less impact on energy eﬃ  ciency improvement in Russia than, for example, in the EU member states. In Russia, 
there are no binding caps for CO2 emissions on companies. Th e implementation of Green Investment Schemes, 
i.e. foreign investment for the transfer of AAUs, could also bring economic beneﬁ t. It could push for techno-
logical modernization and increased competitiveness within Russian industry. To the extent that energy eﬃ  -
ciency technologies become a driver for economic growth, create competitive advantages and new jobs, and 
attract investment into these sectors, they could help the Russian government reach its political goal of increas-
ing the share of higher value added sectors in the overall GDP. Currently GDP growth is driven mainly by 
energy exports rather than more desirable technology ﬁ elds. 
Although President Putin and some other Russian leaders have stressed the issue of energy eﬃ  ciency, in prac-
tice, a real policy push is needed to put in place a legal framework that provides energy eﬃ  ciency incentives for 
the development of technologies that will improve energy eﬃ  ciency in all sectors of the economy where there 
are such potentials. As Western practice shows, improving energy eﬃ  ciency requires a strong political will to 
implement an adequate legal and economic framework. 
About the author:
Dr. Petra Opitz serves as the Head of Department at the German Energy Agency.
Table 1. Key Indicators, 2004
Russia OECD Europe USA Germany
Primary energy consumption per capita (toe/
capita) 4.46 3.50 7.91 4.22
Energy intensity of GDP (kgoe/USD [PPP]) 0.49 0.16 0.22 0.16
CO2 per capita (t CO2/capita) 10.63 7.72 19.73 10.5
CO2-Intensity of GDP (kg CO2/USD 
[PPP]) 1.17 0.35 0.54 0.43
Source: IEA
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Figure 1: Forecast of Increase in Russian Energy Consumption, 2000–2020
Source: Energy Strategy of Russia until 2020
Figure 2: Structure of Energy Eﬃ  ciency Potential in Russia
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